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Briefing Report to the General Assembly 
ltblttinMIUtE 
South Carolina Resources 
Authority Infrastructure 
Fundin Pro ram 
Legislative Audit Council found 
with the South Carolina 
Resources Authority {SCRA) infrastructure 
funding program. Between 1989 and 1991, the SCRA 
(made up of the Budget and Control Board) issued 
approximately $50 million in state bonds and used the 
funds to purchase local revenue bonds for 34 local 
water and wastewater projects. These bonds are often 
referred to as "moral obligation" bonds meaning the 
General Assembly may, but is not required to, use 
state funds to pay the debt when local governments are 
unable to make their debt payments. 
JEDA's Credit Analysis Criticized 
The Jobs and Economic Development Authority 
(JEDA), came under criticism for its staffmg role in 
the program. The LAC report states JEDA performed 
a "weak" credit analysis of bond applicants. They did 
not perform an independent analysis of revenue 
projections, which was vital to ensuring that bond 
debts could be paid. They did not properly evaluate 
the economic environment and other factors relevant to 
the borrowers' financial position, and did not 
adequately document the application process. 
Debt Not Monitored ~ 
The SCRA Act does not require that local governments 
be monitored. Without such monitoring, it is difficult 
for the state to intervene in a timely manner when a 
default seems likely. LAC's analysis of financial 
statements shows that eight of the borrowers may need 
to raise rates to avoid problems in repaying debt to the 
state. Projects were not monitored either during 
construction to ensure funds were used appropriately 
or after completion of construction to ensure that 
revenues were sufficient to pay the debt. 
The General Assembly set aside more than 
$1.2 million to assist some local governments with 
their payments; these bonds were supposed to be paid 
back to the state entirely from revenues produced by 
the local water and sewer systems. Additionally, the 
state has taken a junior position on approximately 70% 
of the debt. The SCRA bond payments are scheduled 
to run through the year 2021. 
Problems with Paying Bond Debt ~ 
One notable problem involved the town of New 
Ellenton, a small Aiken-county municipality of about 
3,000 citizens. As the result of a series of problems, 
the town has defaulted on its $5.025 million sewer 
bond. An engineering study found that the sewer 
system, as currently constructed, cannot support the 
number of users necessary to repay the debt. The 
state set aside $425,000 in appropriated funds to assist 
New Ellenton in making its debt payments. The 
town's problems were caused by several factors, 
including over-stated revenue projections, diversion of 
the bond funds, and the eventual indictment of the 
mayor on state and federal charges. 
Two other towns, Turbeville and Ridgeland, obtained 
revenue bonds and built sewer systems to 
accommodate new state prisons in their area. When 
they could not make their debt payments because the 
prisons failed to open on time, they received state 
funds totalling $802,877. 
WRCC Failed to Use Agency Expertise 
Several agencies that collectively had expertise in 
water/sewer financing, health, economic development, 
and bond programs were involved in the SCRA 
program. However, the Water Resources 
Coordinating Council {WRCC), which conducted ..... 
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the program jointly with the Budget and Control 
Board, did not direct the bond approval process in a 
way that integrated and utilized experienced agency 
staff. The Water Resources Coordinating Council is 
composed of representatives from the departments of 
Health and Environmental Control, Natural Resources, 
and Commerce; the Division of Local Government; 
the Joint Bond Review Committee; and the Governor's 
office. 
Program Goals Not Met 
Although the state's water and sewer needs will total 
over $1 billion between 1990 and 2000, the program 
did not meet the goals set forth in the law. The law's 
stated intent was to promote the general health and 
welfare of all South Carolinians and to act as an 
incentive to foster economic growth, particularly in 
rural, less-developed areas of the state. However, the 
LAC found that, excluding the FMHA refmancings, 
only 42% of the projects funded were located in less-
developed counties, none were in designated imminent 
health threat areas, and only 11% of the local 
borrowers were under a tap moratorium. 
The Council identified several other factors which 
exacerbated the program's inability to meet its goals. 
• WRCC did not fund applicants on the basis of the 
eight criteria set out in the law. No system for 
ranking applicants was adopted and WRCC 
approved all applicants JEDA brought before them. 
• Instances were noted where WRCC took action by 
telephone poll rather than in a public meeting. 
This is a violation of the FOIA. 
• The program was not marketed to applicants that 
most needed assistance, such as those in the rural, 
less-developed areas of the state. 
• WRCC did not establish a formal procedure for 
coordinating funding from various sources. As a 
result, some applicants were approved for or 
received bond revenues when they could have 
obtained funding elsewhere. 
• A lien position policy was not established to 
ensure that the SCRA was in the best position 
possible in case of default by borrowers. 
Outstanding SCRA Bonds 
Amounts shown for participants in the 1989 issue do not include 
certain administrative costs totalling $2,337,000. 
Agency comments to the audit begin on page 45. 
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Executive Summary 
We found that the state has 
committed more than $1.2 
million in state funds to 
assist SCRA borrowers in 
making their debt payments 
to the state, even though 
these bonds were supposed 
to be paid entirely from 
revenues produced by the 
local water or sewer 
system. 
Members of the General Assembly requested that we conduct a 
performance audit of the South Carolina Resources Authority (SCRA) 
Infrastructure Funding Program. 
Between 1989 and 1991, the SCRA (composed of the members of the 
Budget and Control Board) issued over $50 million in bonds to be used to 
fund local government water and wastewater projects. These bonds are 
often referred to as "moral obligation" bonds meaning the General 
Assembly may, but is not required to, use state funds to pay the debt 
when local governments are unable to make their debt payments. The 
SCRA bonds are scheduled to be repaid through the year 2021. 
The program was administered by a large group of state agencies, 
including the South Carolina Resources Authority (SCRA), The Water 
Resources Coordinating Council (WRCC) and The Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority (JEDA). These agencies collectively had expertise 
in water/sewer financing, health, economic development, and bond 
programs in general. The program was designed to function as an 
incentive to foster economic growth, particularly in rural, less-developed 
areas of the state. It has been estimated that the state's water and sewer 
needs will total over $1 billion between the years 1990 and 2000. 
Our review, however, found that the program did not meet the goals set 
forth in the law. We found that the state has committed more than $1.2 
million in state funds to assist SCRA borrowers in making their debt 
payments to the state, even though these bonds were supposed to be paid 
entirely from revenues produced by the local water or sewer system. For 
example, the town of New Ellenton, as the result of a series of problems, 
has defaulted on its bond. An engineering study has found that the sewer 
system cannot support the number of users necessary to repay the debt. 
The state has set aside $425,000 in state funds to assist New Ellenton in 
making its debt payments. 
Also, the towns of Turbeville and Ridgeland have received state funds 
totalling $802,077 for 1993 and 1994 in order to enable them to make 
their debt service payments. In addition, our review found eight 
borrowers that were not in compliance with the debt service coverage 
requirements for either one or both years ending 1992 and 1993. 
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Executive Summiii'Y 
We identified several factors which contributed to the program's inability 
to meet its goals. 
• JEDA's credit analysis of applicants was weak. JEDA did not perform 
an independent analysis of revenue projections, did not evaluate the 
economic environment and other factors relevant to the borrowers' 
financial position, and did not adequately document the application 
process (seep. 6). 
• There was no monitoring of the projects either during construction to 
ensure funds were used appropriately or after completion of 
construction to ensure that revenues were sufficient to pay the debt 
(seep. 13). 
• WRCC did not fund applicants on the basis of the eight criteria set out 
in the law. No system for ranking applicants was adopted and WRCC 
approved all applicants JEDA brought before them. Only 42% of the 
projects were located in less developed counties (see p. 26). 
• We noted instances where WRCC took action by telephone poll rather 
than in a public meeting. This is a violation of the FOIA (see p. 27). 
• WRCC did not create an approval process that fully integrated and 
utilized the collective knowledge of the member agencies (see p. 28). 
• The program was not marketed to applicants that most needed 
assistance, such as those in the rural, less-developed areas of the state 
(seep. 31). 
• WRCC did not establish a formal procedure for coordinating funding 
from various sources. As a result, some applicants were approved or 
received funding which could have obtained funding elsewhere 
(seep. 32). 
• A lien position policy was not established to ensure that the SCRA was 
in the best position possible in case of default. Approximately 62% 
of SCRA's bonds are junior to other outstanding debt (see p. 33). 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
Audit Objectives Members of the General Assembly requested that we conduct a performance 
audit of the Jobs-Economic Development Authority (JEDA) and its affiliated 
corporations. This report is a review of the South Carolina Resources 
Authority (SCRA) infrastructure funding program, and JEDA's role in this 
program. JEDA also administers loan and bond programs, which will be the 
subject of a second report. 
A bill passed by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor, will 
create a new infrastructure funding program to replace the SCRA; this 
program will be administered by the South Carolina Budget and Control 
Board. Therefore, some of the recommendations of this first report are 
directed to the South Carolina Budget and Control Board and successor 
programs. 
We conducted survey work at JEDA and the following agencies: 
Coordinating Council for Economic Development; Department of Commerce; 
Department of Health and Environmental Control; Division of Local 
Government of the Budget and Control Board; Office of the Governor; Joint 
Bond Review Committee; Office of the State Treasurer; and the Water 
Resources Commission. In consultation with audit requestors, we defined 
specific audit objectives which would allow us to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the program and make recommendations for improvements. The review 
focused on the following areas: 
• The background and history of the infrastructure funding program 
including the role of all parties involved. 
• The marketing, application and approval process for the program 
including evaluation of applications and criteria used in decision making. 
• Oversight of the bond program including specific problems in payment 
of outstanding debt. 
Concerns about the repayment of a 1990 revenue bond, issued to the town 
of New Ellenton for construction of a sewer system, led requestors to ask 
that we closely examine this issue. We have included in Chapter 2 a 
discussion of problems associated with the New Ellenton bond and other 
situations where local governments have not been financially able to meet 
their debt obligation. A description of the audit scope and methodology is 
found in Appendix A. A flow chart of the bond process is found in 
Appendix B. Appendix C contains a table of all SCRA bonds. 
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Background and 
History 
The law was intended to 
promote the general health 
and welfare of all South 
Carolinians and to act as an 
incentive to foster economic 
growth, particularly in the 
rural, less developed areas 
of the state. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
In 1981, a report by the Governor's Council on Rural Development found 
that many rural communities did not have access to adequate water and sewer 
services due to limited financial resources and inadequate coordination. The 
report recommended that the Governor help establish a program where 
smaller, rural communities could access the major bond markets, develop a 
regional approach for water and sewer projects, and coordinate funding and 
service borrowers. This may have provided an impetus for the SCRA 
program. Also, it was estimated the state's water and sewer needs would 
total over $1 billion between the years 1990 and 2000. 
The SCRA program was established by Act 682 of 1988, the South Carolina 
Resources Authority Act, that took effect on June 27, 1988. The program 
is a joint effort of SCRA and the Water Resources Coordinating Council 
(WRCC). JEDA is mandated to assist WRCC in its duties. 
JEDA's role in the program is a "staffing" role in support of WRCC. The 
act mandates that JEDA "provide the staff to receive, research, investigate, 
and process applications ... and assist in the formulating of priorities." 
JEDA is to be paid actual costs, not to exceed $100,000 per fiscal year. 
WRCC establishes the funding priorities for all sewer, wastewater treatment, 
and water supply facility projects funded under the act. The law was 
intended to promote the general health and welfare of all South Carolinians 
and to act as an incentive to foster economic growth, particularly in the 
rural, less developed areas of the state. The duties of WRCC are to: (1) 
establish procedures for receipt of applications; (2) in cooperation with 
SCRA, establish criteria for funding priorities; (3) provide to SCRA 
technical assistance from its respective agencies for purposes of screening 
funding applications; and (4) establish the project funding priorities. 
The SCRA, composed of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board 
(B&CB), issued bonds under its name and used the revenue from the sale of 
its bonds to purchase individual bonds of local governments. The local 
governments in tum used the money to improve water and sewer 
infrastructure. Revenues generated by water/sewer plants are used to pay 
SCRA. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
Projects were approved by WRCC and submitted to SCRA. The state 
treasurer must issue the bonds within 60 days of SCRA's acceptance of the 
list of recommendations from WRCC. To date, the program has issued, in 
three issues, over $50 million in bonds: 1989 for $16,810,000 [this was a 
refinancing of outstanding Farmer's Home Administration (FmHA) debt]; 
1990 for $25,980,000 and 1991 for $7,940,000. 
Combining local bonds under SCRA results in more favorable terms than 
would otherwise be available. The bonds are often referred to as "moral 
obligation" bonds, meaning the state may, but is not required to, appropriate 
funds to pay the local government's debt to prevent default. This reduces the 
risk to the investor and lowers the interest rate on the bonds. 
SCRA's board is composed of the Governor as chairman, the state treasurer, 
the comptroller general, and chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee and 
the House Ways and Means Committee. 
WRCC consists of: 
• A representative of the Governor. 
• The commissioner of the Department of Health and Environmental 
Control. 
• The director of the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources 
(formerly the executive director of the Water Resources Commission). 
• The director of the Division of Local Government of the Budget and 
Control Board. 
• The director of the Department of Commerce (formerly the chairman of 
the Coordinating Council on Economic Development). 
• The chairman of JEDA. 
• The chairman of the Joint Bond Review Committee. 
Originally, the chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee were also members of WRCC. However, these 
two members were removed from WRCC by a 1991 amendment. To date, 
the chairman of WRCC has always been the chairman of the Coordinating 
Council for Economic Development. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
On June 2, 1994, the General Assembly ratified the South Carolina 
Infrastructure Facilities Act (Section 11-40-10, et seq. of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws), which was signed by the Governor on October 5, 1994. 
This act changes the program and sets up another organizational structure to 
handle local government infrastructure needs. The South Carolina 
Infrastructure Facilities Authority which, like SCRA, is composed of 
members of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board, is authorized to 
provide grants, loans, bonds and other forms of financial and technical 
assistance to local governments for infrastructure. The act designates the 
Division of Local Government to provide staff to assist the Infrastructure 
Facilities Authority in the administration of the program. 
The new act provides for repeal of the SCRA act when all the bonds issued 
by SCRA are retired. SCRA's outstanding bonds are scheduled to retire at 
various times up to the year 2021. The major immediate impact of the new 
act is to allow SCRA to issue bonds only for the purpose of refunding SCRA 
bonds issued prior to December 31, 1992; it also reduces from $200 million 
to $60 million the total principal authorized amount of SCRA bonds 
outstanding at any one time. Sections of the act regarding the duties of 
WRCC and JEDA will not be repealed until all bonds issued by SCRA are 
retired. 
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Chapter 2 
The Roles of JEDA and SCRA 
Moral Obligation 
Bonds 
The bond rating company rated the SCRA bonds as "moral obligation" 
bonds. This means that, if there is a shortfall in local revenues, the General 
Assembly may appropriate funds to pay any shortfall in principal and interest 
due bondholders. In such a case funds would be deposited to SCRA's capital 
reserve fund, from which principal and interest on bonds would be paid. 
A June 14, 1994, attorney general's opinion, while noting that bond law is 
very specialized and that a bond attorney could interpret this area differently, 
indicates that the state appears to have the power, but not the duty, to incur 
indebtedness on behalf of these revenue-producing bonds. The opinion states 
that, "Whether the General Assembly would determine to pay off the bond 
would apparently be something that would have to be decided by the General 
Assembly on a case-by-case basis." 
The state's credit rating can be negatively affected if bonds default. The 
state has intervened in three cases. The town of New Ellenton has defaulted 
its bond; and according to an official with the state treasurer's office, the 
state has set aside up to $425,000 to help the town make debt payments (see 
p. 22). In addition, state funds have been used in order to prevent default 
on the bonds of Ridgeland and Turbeville. From FY 92-93 through 
FY 94-95, the amount of state funds committed to the three towns totals 
more than $1.2 million. 
Because state funds can be used to cushion local revenue shortfalls, state 
oversight of the local bond debt is important. This is accomplished primarily 
through two means: performing an adequate "creditworthiness" analysis to 
ensure that the local borrower has the ability to pay the bond debt; and on-
going monitoring to ensure that rates are high enough to generate the 
revenues needed, that the covenants of the bond ordinance are followed, and 
that bond proceeds are used appropriately. This chapter reviews how credit 
analysis and monitoring of bond debt were performed. 
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Credit Analysis 
We found no evidence that 
an independent analysis of 
revenue projections was 
completed by JEDA. 
Chapter 2 
The Roles of JEDA end SCRA 
JEDA's overall credit analysis was weak. According to §11-37-200 of the 
South Carolina Resources Authority Act, JEDA is to ". . . provide the staff 
to receive, research, investigate, and process applications for projects made 
to the coordinating council (WRCC) and assist in the formulating of 
priorities." JEDA focused its efforts on determining the creditworthiness of 
the applicants. Creditworthiness is only one of the eight criteria established 
in §11-37-200(B)(2) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (seep. 25) that 
must be considered by WRCC in its review of applicants to the program. 
We reviewed JEDA's files for six borrowers ~ the 1990 and 1991 bond 
issues including: the town of Estill; the Georgetown County Water and Sewer 
District; the city of Isle of Palms; the town of Mt. Pleasant; the city of New 
Ellenton; and the town of Williston. These borrowers were selected 
judgmentally and comprised over one-half of the debt issued in the 1990 and 
1991 bond pools to fmance water and wastewater projects. In applying, they 
were required to submit revenue projections of operations and relevant 
demographic and other data concerning the projects. Our review of these 
files consisted mainly of reviewing JED A's method of analyzing applications. 
We found deficiencies in the files in three categories as outlined below. 
• JEDA relied on projections of operations provided by program 
participants in evaluating the ability of participants to make future debt 
service payments. We found no evidence that an independent analysis 
of the revenue projections was completed by JEDA. 
For example, the projected revenues from the town of New Ellenton sewer 
project were overstated. JEDA did not evaluate the projections and this led 
to debt repayment problems. Also problems have arisen with projections for 
the towns of Ridgeland and Turbeville (see p. 23). Additionally, other 
recipients are having trouble maintaining an adequate level of debt service 
coverage (seep. 10). 
JEDA relied on the fact that the projections were to be prepared by a licensed 
professional engineer as the only assurance that project estimates and 
projections were reasonable and valid. However, in our review of the 19 
files for participants of the 1990 and 1991 issues, we found that revenue 
projections for nine local governments were not adequately certified with a 
professional engineer's signature. Several of the files contained revenue 
schedules signed by the local government's administrator or manager. 
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JEDA did not properly 
evaluate the overall 
economic condition of the 
applicants. 
Chapter 2 
The Roles of JmA and SCRA 
Standard & Poor's (S&P} Debt Ratings Criteria points out that projected 
operations should be analyzed and should not be necessarily assumed to be 
accurate. Assumptions should be challenged, and the results evaluated before 
significant weight is attached to them. 
We interviewed several officials involved with the South Carolina Water 
Quality Revolving Fund Authority at the Division of Local Government. This 
agency makes loans to local governments for wastewater projects and 
requires the signature of the project engineer who must certify that the 
project estimates and projections in the application are reasonable and valid. 
Also division staff prepare independent projections based on historical data 
which are then compared to those submitted by the applicant. 
• JEDA did not properly evaluate the overall economic condition of the 
applicants. JEDA recommended that WRCC accept applicants based on 
the debt service coverage percentage. This was the primary focus of the 
creditworthiness review performed by JEDA. According to S&P, many 
areas should be considered when reviewing the financial viability of 
water and wastewater systems. These include such areas as legal 
provisions (especially the authority to raise rates}, economic 
environment, and operations and finance. 
For example, JEDA did not review the Isle of Palm's historical debt service 
coverage calculations for the three years prior to its application. The system 
had been recently purchased from a private utility company. Although 
historical annual reports containing financial as well as operating information 
were available at the South Carolina Public Service Commission, JEDA's 
program administrator did not obtain or review these records. 
The magnitude of debt service coverage is not as important as the stability 
and predictability of such coverage. Quality of revenues, not quantity, is 
most important, according to S&P. 
• JEDA's loan files lacked essential documentation. We reviewed 11 of 
the 19 loan files of participants in the 1990 and 1991 issues to determine 
if files contained essential documentation required by JEDA. 
The following table shows the results of our examination regarding financial 
documentation which was required by the SCRA application. As shown, we 
did not always find information critical to the evaluation of applicants. 
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Chapter 2 
The Role• of JEDA and SCRA 
Table 2.1: Review of Selected Loan Files for Financial Documentation 
Statements for Last 3 Years 
Current Interim Financial r/ r/ No r/ r/ No r/ r/ r/ No r/ 
Statements 
Operating Budget for the r/ r/ No r/ r/ r/ r/ N/A** r/ r/ r/ 
Current Fiscal Year 
Detailed Projections, r/ No No r/ No r/ r/ r/ r/ r/ 
Prepared/Approved by 
Consulting Engineer 
* Documentation for one year was inadequate. 
* * No current operating budget available for sewer system since it was to be a new system. 
Additionally, our review of selected files revealed deficiencies in methods 
used by JEDA to obtain information. For example, in processing two 
applications for approval by WRCC, JEDA's program administrator stated 
that it was likely he accepted financial information by telephone. We could 
not find written evidence of the information provided by telephone, and we 
could not document the validity or source of the data. 
Also, in 20 of 34 cases, the recommendation for funding was contingent 
upon certain conditions being met by the applicant. Some applicant files 
maintained by JEDA did not document that contingencies had been met. In 
order to confirm resolution of contingencies, we had to secure documentation 
from a variety of state and local sources. 
JEDA assigned only one employee to the SCRA program, and JEDA did not 
follow its own written lending policies. The employee did not have previous 
experience in the financing of water and wastewater projects nor with the 
oversight of public funds. According to this employee, upon employment 
with JEDA, he attended one training workshop which concerned the 
evaluation of local government financial statements. Although this employee 
had some previous lending experience, he may not have had the necessary 
training to perform adequate credit reviews of the participants in this 
program. In addition, we did not find evidence in the files that supervisory 
staff reviewed/approved his work. 
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Recommendations 
Chapter 2 
The Rolea of JEDA and SCRA 
The written procedure currently outlined in 1EDA's lending policy, which 
would have involved several levels of professional employees to provide 
supervision, was not followed. These policies appear to be generic in nature 
and would be applicable to SCRA's program. For example, a step-by-step 
processing flow designates responsibilities, establishes a sequence of events 
and interaction between loan officers and senior staff, and lists required 
documentation. The senior loan officer is required to review and analyze a 
proposal prepared by the loan officer. After any recommendations or 
comments are resolved, a consensus must be obtained with the senior loan 
officer and either the chief operating officer or the chief executive officer 
before proceeding to the loan committee for approval. 
Without a thorough review of the applicants, 1EDA could not be assured of 
the financial viability and ultimate creditworthiness of the participants in the 
program. This program is supported by a moral obligation of the state (see 
p. 5) and relies on future revenues generated by the projects that are funded. 
Without a careful and complete evaluation of each participant, the state 
cannot be protected against the possibility of default of program participants. 
1 JEDA should independently analyze the projections supplied by applicants 
to the program to ensure the adequacy of revenues to support debt 
service payments. 
2 1EDA should consider a broad range of relevant issues when reviewing 
borrowers' creditworthiness and not rely on one calculation. 
3 1EDA should fully document that applicants have met all application 
requirements. 
4 1EDA should assign staff to functions based on their training and 
expertise. Staff should adhere to written lending policy and receive 
adequate supervision from agency officials. 
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In order to calculate debt service coverage requirements as mandated by local 
bond ordinances, we performed a desk review for fiscal years ending 1992 
and 1993 of all participants with outstanding debt held by SCRA. Mt. 
Pleasant and Pageland have defeased (set up irrevocable trusts for) 
outstanding debts. Our review was limited to audited financial statements 
issued by these borrowers. While this was not an in-depth review, it can 
serve to identify potential debt repayment problems. · We found eight 
borrowers that did not have adequate debt service coverage requirements and 
may need to raise rates. These borrowers should be closely monitored by 
SCRA to avoid future difficulties in funding debt service. 
Debt Service Coverage Requirements 
Local bond ordinances, which are generally standard, state that rates and 
charges shall be sufficient to: 
• Pay all expenses of operating and maintaining the system. 
• Build up all required reserves. 
• Provide at least 120% of the annual principal and interest requirements 
of the bond held by SCRA and any further obligations which are 
encumbrances upon the revenues of the system. 
In most cases, ordinances require the local governments to review revenues 
quarterly and to raise rates to correct any shortfalls. In addition, the local 
bond ordinances generally require that a yearly audit be performed by an 
independent certified public accountant. Through amendments to the bond 
ordinances, SCRA could reasonably require that annual audits report, in the 
notes to the financial statements, compliance and/or non-compliance with the 
bond covenant regarding rates and charges. Monitoring efforts would be 
facilitated, and a review such as the one we performed would essentially be 
unnecessary. 
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We calculated the debt service coverage percentage as follows: 
Debt Gross Revenues- (Operating Expenses- Depreciation)- Other Debt 
Service = + 
Coverage SCRA Annual Debt Service Payment 
The result of this calculation should be equal to or higher than 120% in order 
to comply with the requirements of the rate covenant outlined above and 
ensure funds adequate to repay the debt. When funds are not adequate, the 
local government is faced with either using funds from other sources or 
entering default status. Using funds that are not system revenues is a 
violation of the local bond ordinance. 
Results of Our Review 
We found eight borrowers that were not in compliance with the provisions 
of the local bond ordinance concerning debt service coverage for either one 
or both years ending 1992 and 1993. This means their debt service coverage 
was below 120%. Our review found that most of these borrowers had debt 
service coverage below 100%. In 1992, the B&CB directed the Division of 
Local Government to review SCRA's portfolio. Although no official report 
of their review was issued, we obtained brief summaries in order to compare 
our results. Our findings agreed substantially with the findings of local 
government's review. Table 2.2 displays the results of the LAC review 
based on 1992 and 1993 information. 
For 1993, three of the eight, Turbeville, Varnville, and Williston, had come 
into compliance. This may be partly attributable to recent reviews. 
The division's review sometimes commented on the general financial health 
of the borrowers reviewed. They found cases where the local government: 
• Was meeting requirements, but had negative financial trends. 
• Needed to increase funding of depreciation and contingency reserves. 
• Was financially strong but needed a rate increase to be in compliance. 
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Lexington 1990 no no 
New Ellenton 1990 no no 
not 
Santee 1989 and 1990 no reviewed 
Turbeville 1990 no yes 
Varnville 1989 no yes 
Williamston 1989 no no 
Williston 1989 no yes 
All eight borrowers will require special oversight to avoid future difficulties 
in paying debt service on the outstanding bonds held by SCRA. Since debt 
service coverage can fluctuate from year to year because of changes in 
operations, ongoing review of trends can identify potential shortfalls and help 
resolve problems before revenues erode further (see p. 13). Adequate 
monitoring and oversight would include a review, over time, of the local 
government's overall financial condition including downturns in operating 
results. 
Limitations of Our Review 
Our analysis was limited since we obtained figures from audited financial 
statements without the benefit of interviews with relevant personnel or other 
methods to expand our information. Our review occasionally included the 
use of estimates based on available information. In addition, we could not 
determine from the financial statements the amount of funds paid into reserve 
accounts. The required level of payment for reserve funding is not defined 
in the local ordinances. Reserve accounts are required in order to fund 
unforeseen contingencies and replacement of plant and equipment. By not 
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including any provision for reserves, our calculation of debt service coverage 
would be overstated and, therefore, probably overly optimistic. 
The towns of Branchville and Santee were reviewed for 1992 but were 
excluded from our review for 1993 because their audit reports had not been 
issued as of June 29, 1994. 
S The Budget and Control Board should continue to monitor the debt 
service coverage for all SCRA bond participants. 
6 Bonds which are supported by state guarantees should contain language 
in the bond ordinance that requires CPAs performing yearly· audits to 
report, in the notes to the financial statements, compliance and/or non-
compliance with the bond covenant regarding rates and charges. 
7 For its outstanding bonds, SCRA should consider requesting that 
borrowers amend local bond ordinances, within the legal parameters 
already existing, to provide that CPAs performing yearly audits report, 
in the notes to the fmancial statements, compliance and/or non-
compliance with the bond covenant regarding rates and charges. 
The SCRA act does not require that local governments be monitored to 
ensure they are financially capable of meeting their debt obligations and are 
using bond proceeds appropriately. Without such monitoring, it is difficult 
for the state to intervene in a timely manner when a default is likely. If a 
local government has problems repaying its debt, this could impact the state 
negatively since the state may appropriate funds to help local governments 
meet their debts in order to protect the state's credit rating. 
Local bond ordinances uniformly require local governments to comply with 
certain requirements. As sole bond holder, SCRA has the ability to enforce 
compliance with bond requirements. In addition, the state has the authority 
to withhold state funds and/or require the local government to levy an ad 
valorem tax in order to make up any shortfall in debt payments. 
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SCRA's enabling legislation, however, does not expressly require that SCRA 
monitor the financial viability of local governments or ensure that the debt 
service ratio is maintained. JEDA's role is to research and process 
applications for the bonds. SCRA's by-laws limit the state treasurer to 
providing ". . . the staff services required in connection with the 
management, monitoring and administration of the Authority's debt 
obligations." 
According to an official with the state treasurer's office, their monitoring 
consists of receiving notification from the trustee if the monthly debt payment 
is not made, and does not involve reviewing the local governments to 
determine if they are financially able to pay the debt service due to SCRA. 
Additionally, the law does not address oversight of the use of bond proceeds 
during construction, even though 18 of the 19 projects funded in 1990 and 
1991 were for the construction of new or expanded water and sewer 
facilities. Inappropriate use of bond proceeds could affect the viability of the 
systems and their ability to generate adequate revenues. 
Other similar public programs monitor their debt. The FmHA, for example, 
approves monthly payment estimates and makes periodic on-site visits during 
construction to ensure the project is proceeding as planned. The FmHA also 
requires an annual budget and yearly audit reports. The federal funding 
program under the Economic Development Administration {EDA) of the 
United States Department of Commerce and the Division of Local 
Government under the South Carolina Water Quality Revolving Fund both 
perform similar monitoring of their projects. 
Since 1992, the Division of Local Government has been directed to review 
SCRA's portfolio on a yearly basis. However, the B&CB has not formally 
established this as an ongoing program. 
According to both state and federal officials, increased monitoring could raise 
the cost of the program. However, without monitoring the risk of default 
increases. 
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8 The General Assembly may wish to consider requiring a formal system 
of monitoring the debt obligations of local governments which receive 
funding through SCRA. Areas to be addressed include: monitoring 
during the construction of projects; monitoring after projects are 
completed to ensure the continued ability of local governments to meet 
their debt payments; and how the costs of monitoring will be paid. 
Three towns-New Ellenton, Ridgeland and Turbeville-have not been able 
to generate enough revenue to pay for their water and sewer bonds. In order 
to avoid default, the state has committed more than $1.2 million to help the 
towns pay their SCRA debt through FY 94-95. 
Serious issues surround New Ellenton including the lack of controls over 
bond funds, a plant built on private property and failure to hold a voter 
referendum, as well as fraud and embezzlement. The lack of adequate 
revenues may indicate that the system will not be self-supporting in the near 
future. 
The problems in Ridgeland and Turbeville are unlike those of New Ellenton. 
These towns expanded water and sewer systems to meet the demand of two 
state prisons being built. The opening of these prisons has been delayed by 
the state, and the towns have not had sufficient revenues to pay debt service 
to SCRA. The following section details the problems facing the three towns. 
In March 1990, the town of New Ellenton applied to SCRA for financing for 
a new sewer system. SCRA authorized a bond in the amount of $5,025,000; 
approximately $4 million for the estimated cost of the sewer system and 
$1.025 million for fees and the required capitalized interest and debt service 
reserve funds. 
New Ellenton's debt service payments, starting in June 1992, were $35,220 
monthly to NationsBank, which is the bond trustee. Almost immediately the 
town began faltering in its payments, and by June 1993 was in default. In 
February 1994, the former mayor of New Ellenton was charged in state and 
federal court with fraud and embezzlement involving the bond funds. 
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Several agencies became involved with investigating the situation at New 
Ellenton, including: 
• The Division of Local Government of the Budget and Control Board. 
• The state auditor's office. 
• The state engineer's office. 
e JEDA. 
• The State Law Enforcement Division (SLED). 
• The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
We reviewed reports and some documentation collected by those agencies 
that have completed their reviews, and we have conducted our own research 
as well. We have summarized all relevant findings and conclusions below. 
Revenues and User Projections Overstated 
Of the $4.2 million issued for construction of the project, all but $164,000 
was spent by 1993. The sewer system is only 82% complete. The sewer 
system has never been self-supporting, contrary to the revenue projections 
developed by the project engineer. (The project engineer, through his 
involvement in the development firm which owns the land for the wastewater 
treatment site, had a vested interest in seeing that the sewer system was built 
(seep. 17). 
For example, the engineering pro forma, submitted to JEDA as part of the 
bond application, assumes monthly revenues from sewer user charges of 
$47,116 for FY 92-93. The actual monthly revenues from user fees for that 
year averaged $7,069. New Ellenton was forced in 1993 to support the 
system with its general operating funds, which caused financial hardship for 
the town. A financial audit found that the town's sewer department ran an 
operating loss of $260,804 in FY 92-93. 
By June 1994, only 231 customers were actively using the system, instead 
of the 1,085+ users initially shown in the engineering report. Another 181 
customers were not hooked up to the system but are paying a mandatory $25 
a month sewer fee. Gross revenues from the sewer system this year have 
been around $11,000 to $12,000 a month, not enough to pay the current 
monthly debt service of $34,939 plus the costs of operation, maintenance and 
reserves. 
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JEDA did not perform any independent analysis of revenue projections 
provided. by applicants. JEDA should have questioned. the 1,085 users 
initially projected.; some lived. outside town limits along Highway 19 corridor 
and could not legally be mandated. to hook up to the system. The engineer 
estimated. construction costs to be $4 million including this corridor. 
Eliminating this section from the project left about 890 potential users within 
the town limits. 
Also counted. in the projections were another 181 users who lived. in a low-
to moderate-income area. Some of these homes did not even have indoor 
plumbing. Bond funds were not to be used. for sewer lines to this area. 
Instead, the town planned. to apply for a grant for this part of the town. 
However, as of June 1994, the town had not finished. its application for this 
grant. 
Currently, the sewer connection lines do not extend to every house, or even 
to every neighborhood in New Ellenton. According to a consulting engineer, 
even if all potential users are hooked. up, the system as currently constructed. 
can serve only approximately 648 users. At the current fee structure, this 
number of users cannot generate adequate revenues to cover the debt service. 
Because construction funds are depleted, there is no money to extend the 
sewer collection lines. Yet without more users hooked. up to the system, it 
will never generate the revenues needed. to be self-supporting. 
Waste Treatment Plant on Private Land 
The project engineer for the sewer system is involved in the development 
firm which owns the land for the treatment plant and spray field. The 
treatment plant and spray field are built on 165 acres of land leased to the 
town by the Banks Mill Partnership, a real estate development firm, under 
a five-year lease which began July 2, 1990. 
This land is part of a large tract bordering New Ellenton, where the 
partnership also was planning a residential and golf course development 
known as Cedar Creek Properties, Inc. The Banks Mill partnership, doing 
business as Cedar Creek Utility, holds the DHEC discharge permit for the 
wastewater treatment plant and spray field. 
The project engineer for the sewer system was the president of Cedar Creek 
Properties and a managing partner in Banks Mill. In addition to developing 
the original revenue projections for the sewer system, he performed. 
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contracting, designing, inspecting and engineering work for the sewer 
project. 
Prior to 1990, Aiken County had planned to use Cedar Creek Utility's DHEC 
permit and to construct a sewer system for New Ellenton as part of a 
planned, county-wide wastewater treatment system. The treatment plant was 
to be an "interim" plant, until such time that New Ellenton could be part of 
a county-wide sewer system. However, Aiken County could only obtain 
financing and operate the sewer system contingent upon a positive voter 
referendum. This referendum failed, and New Ellenton assumed sole 
responsibility for its portion of the sewer project. 
New Ellenton then negotiated two separate contracts with Cedar Creek/Banks 
Mill in 1990-one for the construction of the sewer system and one for 
leasing the land for the treatment plant and spray field. The land lease runs 
for only 5 years, even though the town's sewer bond debt is payable over 30 
years. 
New Ellenton took over the operation of the wastewater treatment site in 
March 1992. Banks Mill currently leases the 165 acres ofland for the sewer 
plant and spray field to New Ellenton for $10 a year, plus property tax on 
the land. According to New Ellenton officials, this amounts to about $8,000 
annually. When the five-year lease is up, New Ellenton has the option of 
buying the land, at $3,000 an acre with an increase of 7% every year after 
July 1990. Based on these conditions, the 1995 selling price of the land will 
be $694,263. 
The land application permit issued by DHEC, which is needed to operate the 
sewer system, is still held by Cedar Creek Utility, and is not in New 
Ellenton's name. 
According to disbursement records provided by local officials and reviewed 
by the state auditor's office, $903,146 from the bond proceeds was paid to 
Cedar Creek Properties, mostly for land clearing, treatment plant 
construction and a water system. Another $328,000 from the bond proceeds 
was disbursed to the project engineer directly for engineering and design 
work. 
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JEDA's Application Review 
We found no evidence that the information presented to WRCC mentioned 
that the treatment site was to be on private land. Nor did WRCC seem to be 
aware of the relationship of the project engineer with Cedar Creek/Banks 
Mill. 
JEDA had this information but did not act on it or report to WRCC. For 
example, the engineer is identified in JEDA's files in the application package 
on revenue projections and in several pieces of correspondence. The 
resolution passed by the New Ellenton City Council clearly states the 
treatment plant and spray field would be built on land owned by Cedar Creek 
Properties, Inc. The engineer signed the contract between Cedar Creek 
Utility and the town dated April 16, 1990. Finally, a letter to JEDA dated 
March 8, 1990 states "Cedar Creek Properties, Inc., is represented 
by ... [the engineer], who are also New Ellenton's consulting engineers for 
the . . . project." 
We found no evidence that JEDA or WRCC ever questioned the number of 
sewer system users projected in the preliminary engineering report, although, 
as previously discussed, these figures were grossly overstated. In addition, 
both town and state officials based the capacity of the sewer system on 
anticipated population growth in the area. Their assumptions, however, 
depended upon the future expansion of the Savannah River Plant and the 
construction of a research park, which did not occur. 
In the engineering report provided to JEDA as part of the application 
package, the project engineer also stated that the "developers of the Cedar 
Creek Golf Club have plans for approximately 700 residential units and an 
office/industrial park which would require sewer." However, in May 1989 
the project engineer applied for septic tank permits for his Cedar Creek 
development, and after the bond was approved by WRCC in March 1990 he 
received the permits. 
Use of Sewer Bond Funds for Other Purchases 
Although the town spent $4,086,517 in bond construction revenues, a cost 
estimate. performed by a consulting engineer found the present value of the 
sewer system to be $2,642,198. This does not include about $400,000 paid 
for engineering, surveying, and attorney fees. Based on the analyses 
performed by SLED, the state auditor's office and the consulting engineer, 
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we found that at least $940,000 in bond revenues were diverted for uses 
other than the sewer system. 
New Ellenton's former mayor approved the use of approximately $364,000 
from the bond proceeds to purchase a water system from Cedar Creek 
Properties. The water system was purchased to provide water for the 
treatment plant and spray field. It had been installed by Cedar Creek 
Properties originally for use in the subdivision. According to the state 
engineer, the town could have installed a well to provide water to the sewer 
system at a much cheaper cost. 
A consulting engineer's report also found that sewer bond revenues were 
used to build an airfield on the Banks Mill property at an estimated cost of 
$225,300. Several buildings and sheds built on the wastewater treatment site 
cost an additional $63,800. SLED documented the use of $18,881 to buy a 
Piper Cherokee airplane which was titled to the former mayor. About 
$40,000 in bond funds were used to re-pave a road in the Cedar Creek 
subdivision when it was damaged by a break in the water line. 
Former Mayor Indicted for Fraud, Embezzlement 
According to federal and state indictments, other funds are alleged to have 
been diverted by the former mayor of New Ellenton. The state indictment 
charges that he fraudulently submitted at least 25 requisitions to the bond 
trustee, with a total value of at least $246,715. These funds were then 
deposited in bank accounts under the mayor's control and allegedly were 
used for the mayor's personal benefit. Some of these fraudulent requisitions 
allegedly were from fictitious companies controlled by the mayor. Other 
requisitions allegedly padded the amounts actually due to various 
subcontractors. The mayor also is accused of forging endorsements on 
checks written to various vendors and contractors who were being paid from 
sewer bond funds. 
According to the state indictments, the former mayor also engaged in a 
"continuous pattern of misconduct and negligence with respect to the 
administration of his office . . . (which) seriously impaired the construction 
of the Town's Sewer Project .... " 
The federal indictment charges that the former mayor used the United States 
Postal Service and bank wires affecting interstate commerce to bring about 
these frauds. 
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As of June 1994, the SLED and FBI investigations were still ongoing. 
No Controls Over Disbursement of Funds 
With no system of oversight and accountability for the bond construction 
funds, potential for fraud and abuse increased. 
According to a financial audit of New Ellenton, the town had not established 
separate records for the sewer bond revenues, had not maintained a general 
ledger, and had co-mingled sewer bond funds with town funds. Therefore, 
the town did not have in one place a complete accounting for all the 
construction funds. 
In addition, the bond proceeds and disbursements for construction were 
under the control of one individual. The bond ordinance required only a 
requisition certified by the mayor for the bond trustee to release the funds. 
Good business practices were not followed in spending the bond proceeds. 
Most of the materials and services for the sewer were not bid out. 
Requisitions were not always documented by original invoices. There were 
no requirements that the project engineer inspect the work by subcontractors 
before the bank trustee released construction funds. 
According to town officials, the town is not carrying any type of hazard 
insurance on the sewer system, contrary to the bond ordinance requirements. 
The financial audit also confirmed that in several instances the town is in 
non-compliance with applicable laws, regulations and bond ordinance 
requirements involving the sewer system. 
In addition, easements for the sewer lines were not properly obtained from 
residents. According to town officials, only four easements are properly 
recorded. At least three or four property owners have sued for damages 
caused by a lack of proper easements. These cases have been settled with 
the state Insurance Reserve Fund. 
The Referendum Issue 
The South Carolina Constitution, Article VIII, Section 16, requires a 
majority vote of electors for the initial acquisition of a sewer system by 
incorporated municipalities. A referendum is not required if a sewer system 
already exists. Therefore, the town was required to have either a referendum 
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or an existing system. The town's application to JEDA states that the bond 
was to be for a "new system-not part of a regional system"; that a current 
sewer system "does not exist," and that "the town of New Ellenton and 
surrounding areas have no sewerage system. Numerous septic tanks have the 
potential to damage groundwater supplies." 
Yet the final bond ordinance states that there is an existing sewer system, and 
that the "system is operated by and is under the full control and management 
of the Town Council and furnishes sewer services throughout certain areas 
of the Town." According to New Ellenton town officials, this "existing 
sewer system" was no more than a 1,000 gallon septic tank shared by the old 
jail, civic center and former town hall. 
In correspondence maintained at JEDA's office, the local bond counsel stated 
that he determined a referendum was not needed based on the Revenue Bond 
Act for Utilities. This act (§6-21-530) authorizes municipalities to issue 
bonds without first submitting them to voter approval. However, based on 
legal research we have concluded that the voting requirements of Article 
vm, Section 16, apply regardless of the source of funding. 
Since New Ellenton never held a referendum, citizens had no chance to vote 
on a sewer system that would directly affect them with a mandatory hook up 
requirement and user fees. According to a 1993 utility rate survey, New 
Ellenton's sewer rate is $25 for the fust 3,750 gallons, which is the third 
highest in the state. 
Also, without a referendum there was no clear indication that New Ellenton 
citizens supported the sewer project. Some New Ellenton citizens objected 
to the way the sewer system was being planned and financed. Objections 
were made by group of citizens to the Governor's office prior to the issuance 
of the bond. 
The town of New Ellenton is currently under a consent order with the bond 
trustee, NationsBank, to deposit all sewer revenues with the trustee. From 
these revenues, the town is allowed some funds for the operation and 
maintenance of the sewer system. In spite of this, the town still had a 
shortfall of $131,000 for the June 1994 debt service. The state has set aside 
$425,000 to use for debt service shortfalls. 
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A review of this information shows that there was no single cause of New 
Ellenton's sewer problems, but that many factors were involved. These 
include: 
• The overstating of the revenue projections and number of expected users 
of the sewer system. 
• The project engineer who prepared the projections stood to gain from the 
construction of the treatment plant on Banks Mill land. 
• The assumptions that the Savannah River Plant expansion would create 
increased demand. 
• The failure by JEDA to verify the projections and information contained 
in the loan application. 
• The failure to hold a voter referendum. 
• The apparent lack of local support. 
• The failure of the town to obtain proper easements. 
• The inability of the town to maintain the proper accounting records and 
controls over funds. 
• The alleged criminal actions of the town mayor. 
• Finally, the fact that no state-level entity had clear authority to monitor 
the project once funding was approved. 
The towns of Ridgeland and Turbeville have received. state-appropriated 
funds, as well as funds from capital improvement bonds, to help make debt 
service payments on their SCRA bonds. These funds totaled $802,077 over 
two years. Although these funds have been termed "impact fees" in actuality 
they were needed to help prevent default by the towns on their bonds. 
Ridgeland and Turbeville originally obtained SCRA funding in order to 
expand their water and sewer systems to meet the demand of two new state 
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prisons. In 1990, Turbeville signed an agreement with the Department of 
Corrections to provide services to the newly constructed prison. In 1991 
Ridgeland signed a similar agreement. However, the prisons in both towns 
have not been opened. As a result, the towns have not had sufficient 
revenues to pay debt service to SCRA. 
In January 1993, the Department of Corrections paid $250,000 to Turbeville 
and $220,000 to Ridgeland. These payments were made according to 
amendments to the original agreements with DOC and were termed 
"nonrecurring impact fees." Impact fees usually are designed to ensure that 
adequate services will be available for new development. However, 
documentation shows that the fee paid to Ridgeland was based on what the 
town needed to make its debt service payments. 
These fees were charged to the capital improvement bond funds used to 
construct the prisons, and were deemed appropriate by legal counsel as long 
as they would ". . . be chargeable to the capital account of the facility." 
Following this opinion, the Office of the State Auditor confirmed that the 
impact fees would be considered a part of the cost of the capital improvement 
project and subject to capitalization. 
The prisons did not open the following year as well. As a result, the towns 
again did not have sufficient revenues to pay their debt obligations. In June 
1994, the DOC paid $87,625 to Turbeville and $244,452 to Ridgeland as 
impact fees for the availability of services. The Turbeville payment was 
from state-appropriated funds and was based on the minimum monthly usage 
projected for the prison. 
Of the amount paid to Ridgeland, $102,694 was from capital improvement 
bond funds and $141,758 was from a state appropriation specifically planned 
for this payment. Unlike Turbeville, the payment to Ridgeland was not 
based on the minimum monthly usage requirement. Rather, it was based on 
what the town needed to make debt service and pay the operating and 
depreciation costs of the expanded system, and was $36,334 higher than the 
amount based solely on the minimum usage requirement. 
According to DOC officials, no opinion was obtained from an attorney or 
from the state auditor regarding the second payment of impact fees. We 
found no evidence that the agreement between the towns and the DOC was 
amended further to allow the second impact fee. According to a DOC 
official, the Turbeville prison is expected to open in January 1995. 
However, it is anticipated that the Ridgeland prison will not open until 
January 1996. Therefore, it is likely the state will have to assist Ridgeland 
in making debt payments in 1995. 
LAC/SCRA-93-2 South Caroliaa Reloon:es Autllority 
Chapter 3 
The Role of WRCC 
Project Criteria Specifically, pursuant to §11-37-200(B)(2) of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws, WRCC must consider at the minimum the following eight criteria in 
selecting projects. 
(a) Regional development-the need for multi-jurisdictional projects 
and the cooperation and coordination for regional economic 
development projects. 
(b) Development potential-the degree to which economic development 
activity can be stimulated in any given area and infrastructure used 
as a proactive economic development tool. 
(c) Economic impact-the degree to which jobs and income can be 
generated if the infrastructure improvements were made. 
(d) Local commitment and initiative-the availability of the local 50% 
match and local recognition of complimentary infrastructure needs 
including, but not limited to, such needs as transportation. 
(e) Infrastructure need-the degree to which specific infrastructure 
problems can be addressed and solved. 
(t) Area economic need-the degree of local "distress" and need for 
economic assistance, particularly less developed or rural areas of the 
state. 
(g) Creditworthiness-the financial soundness of the infrastructure 
project, including the availability or lack of other funds to finance 
the infrastructure project. 
(h) Public health and welfare-to meet public health and welfare 
requirements within the local area. 
We used these criteria in our evaluation of the effectiveness of the SCRA 
infrastructure funding program. 
This chapter reviews the performance of WRCC in using these criteria to 
establish funding priorities. We also reviewed how WRCC evaluated 
applicants for funding, coordinated with other sources of infrastructure 
funding and administered the program. 
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WRCC did not fund applicants on the basis of the criteria set out in SCRA's 
legislation. Section 11-37-200 of the South Carolina Code of Laws requires 
WRCC to promulgate regulations establishing these criteria for funding 
priorities; WRCC did not do so. No guidance was developed as to how 
much weight should be placed on each criterion. 
The legislative intent of the program, as stated in § 1 of Act No. 682 of 1988, 
was to promote the general health and welfare of all South Carolinians and 
to act as an incentive to foster economic growth, particularly in the rural, 
less-developed areas of the state. Although the program had a $200 million 
cap, information available showed the state's water/sewer infrastructure needs 
will amount to over $1 billion by the year 2000. WRCC approved all 
applicants JEDA brought before them for consideration. 
JEDA, in its role as staff for WRCC, presented a package of procedures and 
documentation for the infrastructure program at WRCC's initial meeting held 
on January 10, 1989. This package included three sections: 
• Operating Guidelines for Receipt, Rating and Ranking of Applications. 
• Application Package. 
• Outline of Marketing Strategy. 
The Operating Guidelines for Receipt, Rating and Ranking presented by 
JEDA was a point system devised to systematically quantify the eight criteria. 
Such a system could have been useful in evaluating which projects should be 
funded. 
However, we were not able to determine from meeting minutes if the ranking 
procedure or the marketing strategy were ever formally approved for use by 
WRCC. Our review of applicant files and information presented to WRCC 
determined that only the application package was used. Implementation of 
the other sections, the ranking and marketing procedures, was not 
documented in the files. 
We attempted to determine how the localities funded through SCRA would 
have scored under the guidelines for three of the more clearly defined 
criteria. We found that a significant percentage of applicants would not have 
scored well under the guidelines. For example, under area economic need, 
projects located in less-developed counties were to receive more points than 
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more developed counties. Of the 19 projects funded by SCRA in 1990 and 
1991, approximately one-third were in developed counties and would not 
have received any points under the proposed rating and ranking system. Only 
42% of the 19 projects were located in less developed counties. 
In addition, localities designated by DHEC as imminent health threat areas 
or under a DHEC-mandated tap moratorium (meaning the existing system 
would not support new, non-residential customers) were to be given a higher 
priority for funding. Our review of the 19 proposed projects found that none 
were designated imminent health threat areas. Only 2 (11%) of the 19 
applicants were under a tap moratorium at the time of their applications for 
SCRA funding. Also, projects which had multiple sources of funding were 
to receive a high ranking. Based on the criteria set forth in the proposed 
guidelines, eight had multiple sources of funding. 
9 WRCC should promulgate regulations establishing criteria for funding 
priorities as required by §11-37-200 of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws. 
Although we did not examine all aspects of compliance with the Freedom of 
Information Act {FOIA), we noted instances where WRCC took action by 
telephone poll rather than in a public meeting. This is a violation of the 
FOIA. 
According to opinions issued by the attorney general, both general law and 
the FOIA require that a public body meet collectively in a formally convened 
meeting in order to take official action upon matters over which it has 
authority. As stated in a 1984 attorney general's opinion, the purpose of the 
rule is to afford each member of the body an opportunity to be present and 
to impart to his associates the benefit of his experience. A telephone poll is 
not considered a meeting for these purposes; however, a telephone 
conference call would have been appropriate as long as all other 
requirements, such as proper notice, were met. 
WRCC members individually approved applicants or increased funding 
through telephone polls conducted by JEDA. For example, a memorandum 
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to WRCC members from JEDA dated March 27, 1989, states that the 
members of WRCC were polled by telephone and approved the town of 
Williston's request for funding. In addition, at its meeting held March 26, 
1990, WRCC tabled a request for funding from the town of Santee, agreeing 
to reconsider the request by telephone after several conditions were met. A 
letter to SCRA from JEDA several months later states that approval was 
granted by telephone poll. This same letter states that telephone polls of 
WRCC members were conducted for purposes of increasing previously 
approved funding levels. We could not document the consistency of the 
information included in the telephone polls because notes pertaining to these 
calls were purged from JEDA's loan files. 
Compliance with the FOIA helps ensure that citizens have access to 
information on the manner in which elected or appointed officials conduct 
public business. 
Willful violation of the FOIA can result in criminal charges. 
10 WRCC should comply with the requirements of the Freedom of 
Information Act governing public meetings. 
WRCC did not create an approval process that fully integrated and utilized 
the collective knowledge of the member agencies. Consequently. WRCC did 
not have adequate information about all relevant issues. Although member 
agencies have staff with expertise in water planning, economic development, 
and health areas, WRCC's decisions on whether to fund projects were based 
largely on JEDA's creditworthiness review. 
WRCC relied on information contained in a summary sheet prepared by 
JEDA staff which consisted of limited financial information relevant to 
creditworthiness of the applicant. There is no evidence the remaining seven 
criteria set out in the law were fully addressed. 
For assistance in screening applicants, JEDA routed applicant information 
only to DHEC, the Water Resources Commission (WRC) and the Division 
of Local Government. According to the records. DHEC and WRC appeared 
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only to check for necessary permits. We found no evidence that these 
agencies were reviewing the applications to determine the existence of health 
hazards, the need for a regional system, etc. The Division of Local 
Government verified whether applicants were also receiving funds from its 
South Carolina Water Quality Revolving Fund Authority. 
Technical information relative to economic development, health issues and 
water planning was necessary to help the program focus on statutory goals. 
The law required members of WRCC to provide technical assistance from 
their respective agencies for purposes of screening funding applications. 
Further, a review of the proposed ranking procedure discussed on page 26 
revealed that input from the various agencies represented on WRCC would 
have been necessary in order for the ranking process to be accomplished. 
While determining creditworthiness is within the scope of activities to be 
performed by JEDA, it was only one of the eight criteria to be considered by 
WRCC when establishing funding priorities. Under the act, JEDA staff alone 
were not expected to become sole providers of technical information, some 
of which is outside their expertise. 
Currently, a Geographic Information System (GIS) initiated by the 
Department of Commerce (formerly the Development Board) could be useful 
in evaluating applicants. Information from this system, which can be 
displayed as maps or statistical reports, is designed to analyze the economic 
impact of water supply and wastewater systems and to encourage proactive 
economic development planning. 
11 Member agencies of the Water Resources Coordinating Council should 
establish an application review system that incorporates their staffs' 
specific expertise and provides for their taking an active role in ensuring 
that participating projects meet the criteria of the program as specified 
in §11-37-200 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. 
12 Data systems such as the Geographic Information System (GIS) should 
be used to the extent possible in evaluating applicants. 
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The 1989 applicant summary used to provide information to WRCC was 
inadequate for later bond issues. We were informed by the JEDA program 
administrator that the format of this summary was expanded for the 1990 and 
1991 bond issues because the initial furmat used for the 1989 issue did not 
supply enough information to WRCC. However, we found five (42%) 
participants in the 1990 issue where JEDA presented applicant information 
to WRCC using the 1989 form. 
The form may have been adequate for participants in the 1989 issue, since 
it involved refinancing outstanding FmHA debt. However, the initial form 
provided insufficient information to WRCC when used for borrowers 
participating in the 1990 bond issue. The participants in the 1990 and 1991 
issues were fmancing the construction and upgrading of infrastructure 
facilities. Therefore, information relative to future revenues from the 
facilities as well as the general financial condition of the applicants was 
critical to the approval process. Regarding creditworthiness, the initial form 
contained only information on outstanding debt and three years of sales 
history. These data alone would not provide WRCC an adequate means of 
assessing the financial condition of the borrowers. 
Lack of useful information could have hindered WRCC's ability to properly 
evaluate program applicants. By law, JEDA's duties included researching 
and investigating the applicants. Without the appropriate presentation of the 
research and investigation, WRCC could not be assured that such activity was 
carried out effectively. 
13 JEDA should provide WRCC with adequate information regarding the 
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For the 1990 and 1991 issues, JEDA did not direct its marketing efforts at 
infrastructure projects the program was intended to serve. This resulted in 
an approach that focused on processing applicants regardless of their 
qualifications to be served by the program (seep. 26). 
At the initial meeting of the WRCC, JEDA presented an Outline of Marketing 
Strategy. This brief outline consisted of six items including the use of a 
preliminary needs survey of local governmental units. JEDA officials stated 
that in order to gauge demand, the needs survey was sent to over 500 local 
government leaders across the state during 1989. JEDA did not maintain 
adequate information on the survey responses, and we could not confirm any 
relationship between the responses available for review at JEDA and the 
applicants or what, if any, follow-up was performed. 
According to JEDA staff, the marketing efforts for the 1990 and 1991 issues 
consisted of visits to local governments that were referred to JEDA as well 
as presentations to groups. 
JEDA's marketing efforts may have been hindered because the appropriate 
target borrowers were not identified by WRCC. WRCC could have used the 
resources of its member agencies to develop a list of potential participants 
meeting the criteria of the program in order to provide the focus for JED A's 
marketing efforts, but it did not. JEDA's efforts did not concentrate on 
target segments of the state. 
14 WRCC should identify target segments of the state that meet the criteria 
of the program in order to facilitate the marketing of the program. A list 
of potential participants should be developed jointly by all WRCC 
members. 




The Role of WRCC 
The WRCC established no formal procedures for coordination of funding. 
Some applicants were approved or received funding which could have 
obtained funding elsewhere. In addition, some applicants may have been 
able to obtain funding from lending programs that had lower borrowing 
costs. 
Some borrowers used funds from several sources to fund their projects. A 
coordinated funding approach, which maximizes economy in borrowing, is 
desirable when serving program applicants who may have limited financial 
resources. While debt costs are borne by the rate payer, the bonds have a 
moral obligation feature which means the state may repay local debt in cases 
where locals are in default status (seep. 5). We identified nine sources of 
funding other than private credit markets. 
Section 11-37-200(B)(2) states WRCC must, as a part of creditworthiness 
review, consider the availability of or lack of other funds to finance the 
infrastructure project. At the initial meeting of the WRCC on January 10, 
1989, the chairman stated, " ... the second function of this Council is to 
coordinate the various sources of infrastructure funding." At a WRCC task 
force meeting held on May 2, 1991, the chairman stated, " ... the (WRCC) 
has a responsibility for the strategic element of consolidating and 
coordinating the various sources of funding available to water and sewer 
systems in the state." 
The chairman ofWRCC instructed staff to require that applications for SCRA 
funding be accompanied by applications for other grants or funding. 
Subsequently, JEDA requested copies of funding applications from several 
state agencies. However, according to a JEDA official, these were not 
provided. 
Section 11-37-180 of the South Carolina code requires local governments to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of SCRA that traditional financing sources are 
not available for the entire project. 
The law allows local governments to satisfy this requirement by producing 
two letters of declination from financial institutions. JEDA did not attempt 
to further determine if any other sources of funding were available. 
However, this control was not effective. Our review of applicants approved 
for funding by WRCC identified two that subsequently withdrew because they 
were able to obtain private funding. In addition, we found one local 
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government that received SCRA funding which could have obtained private 
financing. 
Each local government's bond ordinance obligated them to raise rates to their 
customers when necessary to repay the debt costs. Some other programs had 
funds available at lower borrowing costs and some offered grants. 
Combining funding options could result in lower borrowing costs and, 
therefore, lower water and sewer rates. 
15 The Water Resources Coordinating Council should establish formal 
procedures to ensure better coordination of sources of infrastructure 
funding. 
A review of the 34 local bonds purchased by SCRA found 21 (62%) in 
which SCRA assumed a junior position relative to other outstanding debt. 
Approximately $34 million (70%) of SCRA's over $50 million in bonds is 
junior to other debt. A junior position makes it more difficult to collect 
funds in the event of a default because claims of senior debt holders would 
be paid first. 
We identified 63 bonds which were senior to SCRA bonds. The original 
amount of outstanding bonds to which SCRA was junior ranged from 
approximately $145,000 for one local government to over $16 million for 
another. Of the 63 senior bonds, 38 (60%) were FmHA (Farmer's Home 
Administration) bonds. According to an official with the B&CB's Division 
of Local Government, FmHA debt is traditionally placed in a senior position. 
We also identified 25 bonds which were not FmHA and to which SCRA was 
junior. These included EDA and HUD (United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development) bonds. Also, SCRA took junior positions to 
outstanding loans from the Budget and Control Board. Further, in two 
instanc~, SCRA debt was junior to previously issued SCRA debt. 
Neither the statute nor SCRA by-laws contain a lien position policy. 
According to a JEDA official, neither WRCC nor JEDA had a written lien 
position policy. Local bond counsels were relied upon to determine the lien 
position of SCRA debt. 
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The South Carolina Water Quality Revolving Fund Authority administered 
by the B&CB's Division of Local Government adopted a lien position policy 
which .. . . . requires the best lien position on the pledged revenue stream that 
is reasonably available from and affordable to the applicant.,. According to 
an official with the local government division, the authority has, in the past, 
obtained a parity position with a local government's outstanding Budget and 
Control Board debt. According to officials with JEDA and the Division of 
Local Government, in 1990 SCRA took a junior position at the request of a 
local government. In contrast, in 1991 the SRF declined to take a junior 
position when requested by the same local government. 
Establishing a lien position policy may help the state ensure it obtains the 
most secure position possible in the event of a default by a local government. 
However, a strict policy requiring SCRA to be on parity with other debt 
could result in fewer borrowers qualifying for SCRA bonds. In addition, it 
could result in local governments being forced to raise user rates higher than 
otherwise would be required to obtain SCRA funding. Therefore, any policy 
developed should remain broad enough to accomplish the objective of 
reducing risk for the state while being reasonable and affordable for local 
borrowers. 
16 The General Assembly may wish to consider requiring the SCRA to 
establish a formal lien position policy which places the state in the most 
secure position possible while being reasonable and affordable for the 
local government. 
Chapter 4 
Infrastructure Facilities Authority Act Review 
On June 2, 1994, the General Assembly ratified the Infrastructure 
Facilities Authority Act (IFAA) §11-40-10 et seq. of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws. The bill was signed by the Governor on October 5, 1994. 
The IFAA creates an authority to replace SCRA (see p. 4). One major 
difference between the IF AA and SCRA is the IF AA does not issue bonds 
backed by a moral obligation of the state, according to bond counsel. 
Instead the act creates a revolving loan fund, to be capitalized from 
various sources, including state appropriations and federal funds. Loans, 
grants or bonds based on the fund are made available to communities for 
infrastructure projects. A second difference is that the IFAA broadens the 
types of projects which can be funded to include solid waste projects in 
addition to water and sewer projects. Also, the program would be 
administered by the local government division of the Budget and Control 
Board rather than the Jobs-Economic Development Authority. 
We noted two principal areas of concern where the acts differ. These 
differences could have a negative effect on program outcomes. 
Priorities for Funding Not Identified 
The SCRA was created, in part, to fund projects in rural, less-developed 
areas of the state. The act contains eight specific criteria which were to 
be considered when projects were funded. The Water Resources 
Coordinating Council (WRCC), composed of individuals with expertise 
and authority in areas such as economic development, health and water 
issues, was directed to set priorities based on the criteria set forth in the 
act. 
The IFAA does not contain specific criteria setting forth how projects are 
to be prioritized. The act states that "all local governments are authorized 
to borrow money ... [and] are also authorized to apply for, accept and 
receive grants ... " (§11-40-SO(A)). The Joint Bond Review Committee 
{ffiRC) is directed to assist in establishing priorities for funding of the 
projects (§11-40-90(0)). However, it appears that the ffiRC's 
involvement would be limited to entities funded through revenue bonds 
and would preclude their involvement with loans or grants. 
Paae35 LAC/SCRA-93-l South CaroliDa Resources Authority 
Chapter 4 
lnfraatructure Facilitiaa Authority Act Review 
Composition of the Authority 
Unlike the SCRA legislation in which members of WRCC participated 
because of their involvement with technical and financial aspects of 
infrastructure, this act does not appoint a panel of experts to evaluate 
projects. The Infrastructure Facilities Authority is composed of the 
members of the Budget and Control Board. This membership could be 
expanded to include a panel of experts; at the minimum, such a group 
could be advisory to the IFAA. While the staff of the local government 
division have various experience and backgrounds in similar financing 
issues, they do not share the collective authority and perspectives of those 
who serve at the state and local level in these areas. 
Other states have established boards with varied expertise. For example, 
Georgia's Environmental Facilities Authority consists of three ex officio 
members, including the commissioner of community affairs, the state 
auditor, the commissioner of industry and trade, and eight members 
appointed by the Governor. The eight members are composed of 
municipal and county officials and members of the public. The Virginia 
Resources Authority consists of the state treasurer, the state health 
commissioner. the director of the Department of Environmental Quality 
and six members appointed by the Governor. 
Key Program Elements 
We performed a limited review of the act to determine if it contained key 
elements necessary to a solid infrastructure financing program. As stated 
in our report, the key elements include: 
• Appropriately defined and targeted funding priorities. 
• Proper marketing efforts. 
• Technical assistance from various interested state agencies. 
• Coordination of various types of available financing. 
• A credit analysis of each borrower. 
• Monitoring of the borrower during construction of a project as well as 
throughout the repayment period. 
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The IFAA does contain language which addresses some of these elements. 
For example, the IFAA requires that the Division of Local Government 
assist the authority in analyzing and evaluating local governments, 
monitoring compliance by local governments, assisting local governments 
in applying for other state or federal aid and providing information to 
local governments on the authority's programs (§11-40-250). 
However, regulations should be promulgated to ensure proper 
administration of the program including the duties and responsibilities of 
the staff. For example, the procedures used to analyze a borrower's 
historical and projected financial operations must be developed and 
consistently applied. As we note in this report, the failure to establish 
comprehensive regulations can impede the operations of a financing 
program. 
17 The General Assembly may wish to consider amending the IFAA to 
set forth specific criteria to be met for entities applying for funding. 
18 The General Assembly may wish to consider amending the IFAA to 
include membership from state agencies and other entities with 
expertise in the area of environmental infrastructure. 
19 The Budget and Control Board should promulgate regulations and 
establish policies addressing the key elements of an infrastructure 
funding program. These should include at a minimum regulations 
addressing funding priorities, marketing, technical assistance, 
creditworthiness analysis, coordination of funding and monitoring. 
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Appendix A 
Audit Scope and Methodology 
We reviewed the operation of the infrastructure funding program from its 
inception in 1988 through its latest activity in 1991. Primarily, our audit 
concentrated on the period from 1989 through 1991 during which three bond 
issues were negotiated. The program has been inactive since 1992. 
There were concurrent audits and reviews of program participants being 
carried out by other agencies. These included a review of bond performance 
of selected borrowers by the Division of Local Government at the direction 
of SCRA. Additionally, ongoing examinations of New Ellenton were being 
conducted-a financial audit for FY 92-93 contracted out by the state 
auditor's office, an engineering review of New Ellenton's sewer system by 
the state engineer's office in conjunction with a contracted engineering firm, 
an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and an investigation 
by the State Law Enforcement Division. There is also an ongoing lawsuit 
that involves the town of New Ellenton. We defmed the scope of our review 
to avoid duplication with other reviews or issues currently in litigation. 
JEDA records and bond documents were the primary evidence we examined 
in conducting our audit. We did not rely on computer-generated data. We 
examined a sample of JEDA's files in order to assess the completeness of 
information provided by applicants and the ensuing creditworthiness analysis 
performed by JEDA. We evaluated the adequacy of the information provided 
to the Water Resources Coordinating Council (WRCC) in its deliberations. 
We also examined documents of the local government division's review of 
borrowers' bond performance and information from other WRCC member 
agencies. We also reviewed promotional information on the bond program 
provided by JEDA during the marketing of the program. We reviewed 
minutes of board meetings for JEDA, WRCC, and SCRA from FY 88-89 
through FY 91-92. We conducted interviews with JEDA officials and WRCC 
and SCRA agency staff. We interviewed officials with other states and the 
federal government. We interviewed an official with the rating company that 
rated the SCRA bonds and bond attorneys. 
The primary criteria we used to measure the program's effectiveness were 
state statutes relating to the program. We obtained information from other 
states with similar programs and reviewed general literature in the field and 
reports from other states. We included all outstanding bonds issued by the 
program in our review, rather than use a sampling approach to accomplish 
our objectives. This audit was conducted in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 
Page41 LAC/SCRA-93-l South CaroliDa Resources Authority 
Appendix 8 
Bond Process Flow Chart 
.ASIIstance of bond counsel, 
undeiWifter, financial 
advllor, 8lc. 
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handled by a trustee. See 11018 below. 
lnveatora 
1. SCRA sells 
bonds. Investors 
paySCRA. 
2. SCRA buya bonds from 
local governments with 
proceeds from at&p 1. 
3. Local governments use revenues 
(generally those revenues earned by the 
project being funded) 1D pay lntefeat and 
principal on local bonds. 
4. SCRA uses paymeniS 
from atep 31D pay lntereat 
andprlnclpalonSCRA 
bonds. 
SCRA designates a trustee (a bank) to handle its financial matters. For example, for the 
1990 and 1991 bond issues, the trustee was responsible for such activities as the 
collection and custody of local obligation payments, as well as payments to SCRA bond 
holders. 





Amounts shown for participants in the 1989 issue do not include certain 
administrative costs totalling $2,337,000. 
Source: 1989, 1990 and 1991 Trust Indentures. 
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South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority 
October 13, 1994 
Ms. Cheryl A. Ridings 
Deputy Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
400 Gervais Street 
Elliott E. Franks, III 
Chief Executive Officer 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Ms. Ridings: 
Pursuant to our final exit review of the Performance Audit of the 
south Carolina Resources Authority Infrastructure Funding Program, 
we enclose our written comments which we wish you to publish as an 
appendix to the report. As required by LAC policy, our comments do 
not exceed ten pages. 
If there are questions or if there is a need to confer with me, 
please so advise. 
f!L ". ,.lJ 
sin~ely, 
Ellio t~, III 
EEF/dbr 
c: Mr. Robert L. Mobley, Chairman 
Mr. Charles Kerekes 
Mr. David B. Roper, Jr. 
1201 Main Street. Suite 17SO Columbia. South Carolina 29201 (803) 737..0079 FAX (803) 737..0016 
Agency Comments 
As a preface to its response to specific allegations of the Legislative Audit Council (LAC), JEDA believes that it is important to comment 
on the framework of the infrastructure bond program and JEDA's role in the program. The program was conceived as an immediate 
response to reported estimates of $200-$300 million of infrastructure need across the State of South Carolina and an inability of local 
governments to obtain fmancing necessary to meet the need. The response came in the form of the South Carolina Resources Authority 
(SCRA) Act, establishing the program which is the subject of this audit. The original bill was introduced by the Governor, who believed 
that a quick and effective response to South Carolina's infrastructure needs was essential to the health and welfare of its citizenry and 
growth of its economy. When the legislation was conceived, it was understood that the participants would not be triple-A credits, but 
the legislation made provisions for the ultimate protection of the State's credit rating. Strength of the whole concept involved several 
levels of protection for the state. Should for any reason a unit of local government fail to make debt service payments under an SCRA 
bond issue, it was fiTSt provided, under Section 11-37-260, that " ... the State Treasurer shall withhold from the local government sufficient 
monies from any state appropriation to the local government and apply so much as is necessary to the payment of the principal of and 
interest on the local obligation of the government." This section further provides "If the local government does not receive state aid in 
an amount necessary to repay the obligation, the Comptroller General may levy and require the applicable county treasurer to collect and 
remit to the Authority an ad valorem tax sufficient to meet the obligation." Working in conjunction with these provisions was the 
provision, under Section 11-37-190, that the General Assembly could appropriate funds to replenish the debt service reserve fund should 
it be depleted as a result of a local government's failure to make debt service payments as required. It was understood from the outset 
that such circumstances might well occur under a program providing weaker local governments with access to the State's borrowing power 
in the open bond market. But, it was believed that the funding need was urgent enough that such a program was necessary, and, 
ultimately, the State's credit was protected. 
Furthermore, JEDA must state emphatically that the LAC's interpretation of whom this program was intended to help was far different 
from the interpretation of the Water Resources Coordinating Council (WRCC). In the LAC's evaluation of the role of the WRCC and 
the eight basic criteria established for funding priorities, it singled out three of the criteria, applied its own interpretation of the criteria, 
and arrived at the conclusion that the WRCC should have recommended only those projects from rural, less-developed counties, which 
had either been designated by DHEC as imminent health threat areas or were under DHEC-mandated tap moratoriums, and which had 
multiple funding sources. While the WRCC gave appropriate weight to the three criteria under which such projects would qualify for 
funding and recommended a number of applicants qualifying under those criteria, it also recognized that an important focus of the 
program, as specified by the SCRA Act, should be directed toward projects that would foster economic growth in any part of the state. 
The eight criteria and the implementation of them by the WRCC are addressed more specifically later in the body of JEDA's response. 
It should be noted here, however, that JEDA firmly believes that the WRCC, with staff support from JEDA, discharged its responsibilities 
under the SCRA Act in the true spirit of the Act. 
JEDA also believes that the LAC has misconstrued JEDA's role and responsibilities under the SCRA Act, and never grasped the true 
accomplishments of JEDA and the WRCC under the program. JEDA's role and responsibilities are addressed in one sentence under 
Section 11-37-200 of the Act, stating simply " ... The South Carolina Jobs Economic Development Authority shall provide the staff to 
receive, research, investigate, and process applications for projects made to the Coordinating Council and assist in the formulating of 
priorities." JEDA asserts that it discharged these responsibilities exceptionally well within the framework of the Act, and that it went even 
further with underwriting due diligence not specifically required along with a very proactive marketing program to educate local officials 
across the state about this new source of water and sewer fmancing. 
Chapter 2: The Roles of JEDA and SCRA 
Credit Analysis (see pp.6-9) 
LAC alleges that JEDA focused its efforts only on the creditworthiness of applicants and essentiaUy ignored the other seven criteria 
that the WRCC was required to consider in reviewing applicants to the program. 
To the contrary, all eight criteria were evaluated and discussed at every WRCC meeting, as detailed below. 
Regional development: Most of the projects funded were of an urgent nature and could not be delayed until they could be done as a part 
of a regional system. This was addressed by JEDA and was discussed by the WRCC every time that projects were considered for funding. 
Another problem discussed in the WRCC meetings which hampered the development of regional water and sewer systems was the fact 
that the State of South Carolina is still largely rural and communities are separated by large areas that are unpopulated or very sparsely 
populated. The cost of developing regional systems under such conditions is prohibitive. A case in point is the sewer project for the Town 
of New Ellenton (1990), a small rural community in Aiken County, just the type of community targeted by the SCRA legislation. This 
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project originated with the Aiken County Public Service Authority's long tenn county-wide sewer plan, under which the entire county 
would eventually be served by sewer lines feeding into the Horse Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant. This treatment plant remains 
seriously under-utilized, but the cost of sewer lines and pump stations to pump wastewater from most of the county is not economically 
feasible. Aiken County Council in late 1989 targeted the New Ellenton/Cedar Creek area for sewer service because of its proximity to 
the Savannah River Site and the expansion plans of the Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation.(See Exhibit A) When Aiken County 
Public Service Authority detennined that it would be cost prohibitive to pump sewage to Horse Creek WWTP (in excess of $20MM in 
1990), Aiken County urged the Town of New Ellenton to pursue a package plant/land application project as an interim measure to provide 
sewer to the area, with the promise of technical support from the Aiken County PSA and an expanded user base from existing and 
projected development outside the city limits of New Ellenton. After the project was started, an Aiken County referendum denied the 
County the right to implement county-wide sewer service under its long tenn plan, and essentially pulled the plug on the expansion of 
New Ellenton's prospective user base. 
Development Potential: This was a major consideration with every project considered. Again, The Town of New Ellenton is a good 
example of a project which was considered by JEDA and the WRCC to be a somewhat undeveloped area with strong development 
potential. New Ellenton was legitimately on the verge of major development in 1990, with Westinghouse's plan to move high level 
operations to SRS. When the world situation changed so drastically with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire Eastern bloc., 
Westinghouse cancelled expansion plans for SRS and dealt a death blow to the Town of New Ellenton's development plans. (See Exhibits 
A-2 and A-3.) Another example is the Town of Santee (1990), a small rural community in Orangeburg County, again just the type of 
community targeted by the SCRA legislation. Although Santee has a history of poverty and very little in the way of job opportunities, 
its proximity to 1-95 and Lake Marion, with all its recreational opportunities attracting tourists and retirees, has given the town excellent 
growth and development potential. Without the SCRA funding for its water system expansion, which was at capacity in 1990, the Town 
of Santee could not have accommodated the development it is currently experiencing, with a thriving new Shoney's restaurant creating 
65-75 jobs and the new "Project Main Street" downtown development. Without SCRA funding in 1990 for the small rural Town of Estill's 
water and sewer system expansion to accommodate a new Federal prison, the Town could not have secured the commitment for the prison, 
which brought with it new jobs, income, tax revenues and opportunities for further growth and development. Likewise, the two small 
rural communities of Ridgeland and Turbeville were offered opportunities for growth and development with new jobs, income and the 
resultant tax revenues if they could expand their water and sewer systems to accommodate two new State prisons authorized by the General 
Assembly for construction on the outskirts of these two towns. The Turbeville expansion would serve an 808-bed prison facility and also 
would bring water and sewer to the intersection of 1-95 and U.S. Highway 378, offering an opportunity for even further development and 
generating over 525 new jobs. The expansion of rural Edgefield County's water treatment and distribution facility to accommodate its 
development potential (See Exhibit B) could not have been accomplished without funding from the SCRA's 1990 Local Government 
Program Revenue Bonds. The SCRA also came to bat for the small rural Town of Saluda, providing funding in 1990 for the Town's 
wastewater treatment plant expansion, increasing capacity to allow for further growth within the region.(See Exhibit C) 
Economic impact: As it relates to the opportunity for immediate results in the fonn of commitments for new industry, new jobs and 
increased income for communities, economic impact was one of the eight criteria which carried a high priority with JEDA and the WRCC. 
Commitments to two of these communities came via the General Assembly which, in its wisdom, approved the construction of prisons 
for Turbeville and Ridgeland. Based upon these actions, both communities proceeded to develop plans to construct and fund water and 
sewer projects which were prerequisites for the prisons. The prisons promised immediate job creation and income for these communities. 
The commitments would not have been secured by either of these towns had not JEDA and the WRCC recommended SCRA funding for 
these small rural communities through the 1990 and 1991 bond pools. The City of Dillon, another small rural community with town and 
county unemployment well above the State average and per capita income well below the State average, was able to secure a commitment 
from Perdue Fanns, Incorporated, for a large chicken processing facility, projected to employ 500 local citizens. This new facility would 
also create income and employment opportunities for poultry fanns in the area. This opportunity would have been lost had not JEDA 
and the WRCC brought the SCRA into the picture to participate in a funding package that included $2,960,000 in grant funds from EDA, 
the Governor's Office (CDBG funds), the Division of Local Governments and SCAN A. The economic impact of direct job creation also 
was a strong consideration in the WRCC's prioritizing of funding for the water and sewer system expansion of the Town of Estill. The 
Town had secured a commitment for the construction of a new Federal Prison which would create 250 new jobs for the citizens of Estill, 
but the commitment was contingent upon the Town's securing funding for a water and sewer system expansion. Funding from the SCRA's 
1990 bond pool also enabled the Town of Estill secure a $1,000,000 EDA grant from the U. S. Department of Commerce and a $500,000 
CDBG grant the Governor's Office to complete the funding for this project. 
l.ocal commitment and initiative: The program as designed included all of the identified state agencies involved with the certification or 
funding of water and sewer projects. Additionally, the Chairman of the WRCC was also the Chainnan of the State Development Board 
and the Coordinating Council for Economic Development. Meetings were held by JEDA's program administrator and Executive Director 
with Messrs. Greer and Spivey, respectively, to review ways to improve coordination of funding with other sources. (See Exhibit D) 
JEDA additionally maintained a close working relationship with Pat Dixon, South Carolina's economic development representative with 
the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce, to assist in providing the local match required 
on all projects funded by EDA. The City of Dillon's 1991 bond issue was one project that involved a significant investment by EDA, 
matched with funds from an SCRA bond issue. The Town of Saluda was given special consideration and approved for funding in the 1990 
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bond issue so that it would not lose a 1988 EPA grant in the amount of $357,000 which was due to expire if local matching funds were 
not secured. A $200,000 grant from the Division of Local Governments of the State Budget and Control Board was also at risk if funding 
could not be obtained to complete the projects. This funding was completed with a $75,000 CDBG grant from the Governor's Office and 
the 1990 SCRA bond financing (See Exhibit E) The Town of Ridgeland's proposed water and sewer system expansions to serve an 1100-
bed State correctional facility presented an opportunity for the SCRA to participate with the State Revolving Fund (SRF), administered 
by the Division of Local Governments of the South Carolina Budget, and Control Board, in funding this expansion. The Town of 
Ridgeland had already applied for SRF funding when JEDA became aware of the project, but the SRF could only fund wastewater 
projects, and JEDA presented the water system expansion project to the WRCC and secured its approval for funding in the SCRA's 1991 
bond pool to complete the funding package. Since the Chairman of the WRCC was also Chairman of the Coordinating Council for 
Economic Development which administered highway set-aside funds, coordination of water and sewer project funding with complementarY 
highway infrastructure projects was an opportunity to which JEDA remained alert and discussed with the Chairman and his Executive 
Assistant, Deborah Bass. 
Infrastructure need: A large number of the projects funded were done so to solve specific identified infrastructure problems. As noted, 
only two of 19 funded after 1989 were under tap moratoriums, but four others were under DHEC consent orders to upgrade systems and 
two others were under DHEC order to comply with new EPA regulations. DHEC issues consent orders when a water or sewer provider 
demonstrates to DHEC that it is taking appropriate actions to upgrade a system and can serve to prevent DHEC from placing the system 
under a moratorium or to rescind a moratorium. For example, Edgefield County Water and Sewer Authority was operating under a DHEC 
moratorium when it applied for SCRA funding in October 1989. Although its water treatment plant normaUy pumped 1.8 to 2.0 MGD 
with a permitted capacity of 4.4 MGD, DHEC looked at peak day occurrences of 6.0 MGD and placed the system under a moratorium, 
prohibiting any new taps. With funding approved for a project to correct this problem, Edgefield could obtain a consent order from 
DHEC, rescinding the moratorium. (See Exhibit F) One other community operating its water system under a DHEC moratorium requested 
SCRA funding. This was the Town of Williston. (See Exhibit G) The Town's financial recordkeepingand the fmancial condition of the 
water system made this application difficult for JEDA to recommend to the WRCC. However, because of the Town's inability to comply 
with DHEC and come out from under the moratorium without SCRA funding, the WRCC granted conditional approval to Williston if 
it could comply with several conditions that would improve its creditworthiness. The Town complied and funding was provided by the 
SCRA in 1991. Also, Georgetown County Water and Sewer District was placed under a DHEC consent order subsequent to approval 
of its 9/12/89 SCRA application for system expansion, but prior to funding in June 1990. This consent order required the District to 
complete fluoride reduction measures to its water supply system by the summer of 1991, and the District requested by letter an increase 
in its SCRA funding in order to comply. Recognizing the urgency of this request, the WRCC acted promptly, granting approval on 
5/10/90 and arranging for the increase to be included in the June 1990 bond issue of the SCRA. (See Exhibit H) As another example, 
the City of Isle of Palms was under DHEC consent orders for its water system and its wastewater treatment system, both of which had 
been acquired with consent orders from a private owner unwilling to spend the money to upgrade the systems. The City acquired the 
systems and applied for SCRA funding to complete the mandated projects. JEDA and the WRCC recognized that the City of Isle of Palms 
had a legitimate need qualifying for SCRA funding and that without SCRA funding, many citizens in the area would suffer hardships.(See 
Exhibit I) WRCC approved the project and recommended funding in the December 1991 SCRA bond issue. Also, JEDA presented the 
WRCC with a request for funding from the Town of McCormick to comply with a DHEC consent order to construct a facility to treat 
alum sludge and fllter backwash water for its water system by 1/l/91. (See Exhibit J) McCormick is a smaU rural community that could 
not have complied with the DHEC order without funding assistance from the SCRA. The WRCC recognized this, approved the project 
and recommended it for funding in the SCRA's 1990 bond issue. The Town of Pageland was also under DHEC consent order to upgrade 
its water system with two alum sludge lagoons and applied for SCRA funding. Also included in Pageland's request was a wastewater 
treatment plant project to comply with new EPA regulations (See Exhibit K). Pageland was another smaU rural community needing SCRA 
funding for compliance with a DHEC order. This, too, received priority consideration by the WRCC and was recommended for funding 
in the SCRA's 1991 bond issue. Funding for compliance with new EPA regulations was also requested by the Town of Fort Mill and 
approved for SCRA funding in 1991. (Exhibit L) JEDA realized that all of these situations qualified a project to be prioritized under 
the criterion of Infrastructure Need and presented qualifying projects as such to the WRCC. 
Area economic need: One of the first activities undertaken by JEDA in marketing the new program was a series of regionwide meetings 
with each of the ten regional planning councils and leaders from most of the communities they represented. These meetings were 
conducted throughout the week of January 31-Februaey 3, 1989, and included presentations by Robert McMullan and Steve Klein of the 
investment banking fum of Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette and Sam HoweU of the law fum of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay and Guerard. 
These grass roots meetings were conducted in order to fuUy explain the new infrastructure funding program to community leaders on their 
own turf. Furthermore, JEDA's program administrator participated in workshops and made presentations to the South Carolina 
Developers' Association, the South Carolina Conference of Black Mayors, the Finance Subcommittee of the Permanent Advisoey 
Committee on Rural Economic Development. These presentations were made to impress upon participants how SCRA funding of 
water/sewer projects could assist rural communities with their development potential and play an active role in aUeviating economic 
distress. JEDA's program administrator also attended many functions to meet with rural community leaders and discuss the SCRA 
program with them one-on-one. These functions included the State Development Board's Allies Meetings, meetings of the Municipal 
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Association and the Association of Counties, B. P. Barber and Associates' annual receptions for municipal delegates, annual Governor's 
Rural Leaders Conference. Contacts made at these meetings and functions were followed up with personal calls on the community leaders 
to further discuss infrastructure needs and funding through the SCRA program. 
Program marketing was defmitely targeted at less developed or rural areas of the state. While these were the areas experiencing the 
greatest degree of distress, and were the areas that could have benefited most from infrastructure improvements, these were also the areas 
most difficult to fund with SCRA bonds. Leaders of these communities were usually willing to wait and do nothing, hoping for grants 
that would not have to be paid back, or SRF funding which they expected to get at 2% interest. Many communities refused to consider 
SCRA funding which was always at market rates, indicating that their users couldn't afford the rate increases necessary to service the debt. 
The problem then and now in many rural communities is simply an inability of the user base, under reasonable fee schedules, to adequately 
meet required debt service on the high cost of infrastructure projects. 
In addition to JEDA's 1989 survey of infrastructure needs, and subsequent one-on-one followup on all responses, JEDA's program 
administrator also made a very thorough analysis of the results of an ACIR Statewide Capital Needs Survey and made numerous calls on 
rural community leaders who had indicated a need for infrastructure projects. Furthermore, Meetings were held with all identified law 
firms whose attorneys represented communities in the issuance of water and sewer bonds, i.e., McNair Sanford, Sinlder Boyd, Nelson 
Mullins Riley & Scarborough, and Haynsworth Marion McKay & Guerard. JEDA's program administrator also initiated meetings around 
the state with engineering firms active in water and sewer projects, including B. P. Barber & Associates, Sirrine Environmental 
Consultants, Inc., Davis & Floyd, Engineers, Wiedeman & Singleton, Dunn & Associates, Rogers & Calcutt Engineers, Inc., D. C. 
Barbot&Associates, Inc., Gary Hubbard, P.E., Harwood Beebe Company, Inc., A. W. Shoalbred, P.E., Hussey, Gay, Bell &DeYoung, 
Site Consultants, Inc., CH2M Hill, Cantelou Associates, Inc., and Leon Campbell & Associates, Inc. 
Public health and welfare: This was always a consideration in JEDA's analysis and when the WRCC reviewed projects for funding. For 
example, New Ellenton had serious problems with septic tanks that didn't drain properly because of unsuitable soil conditions (particularly 
troublesome in wet weather), as well as some instances of surface discharge of raw sewage. Also, Georgetown County borrowed to 
provide sewer service to developments which were on septic tanks that didn't drain properly or which were contaminating wetlands. The 
Towo of Isle of Palms had acquired private water and sewer systems which were contaminating shellfish and .surrounding wetlands and 
were under DHEC consent orders to correct permit violations and to comply with the Clean Drinking Water Act. All of these projects 
were given priority consideration because of the severity of the health problems presented by the situations. 
Creditworthiness: The financial soundness of the project and the availability of other funding were always strong considerations of JEDA 
and the WRCC in evaluating projects for funding through the SCRA bond program. However, the WRCC consistently evaluated each 
applicant's fmancial condition in relationship to the other seven criteria, and in many cases made special efforts to give applicants guidance 
in improving their fmancial condition so that the projects could be funded. JEDA doesn't claim infallibility with respect to the credit 
analysis approach it developed for the program. Experienced and competent lenders will all document the fact that there is no perfect 
system, nor a system that is free of all error on occasion. However, the credit review system was developed through consultation with 
the Virginia Resources Authority, a very active and effective infrastructure bond bank, and Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, a successful 
investment banking and underwriting firm with vast infrastructure financing experience. Further validity of the quality of the JEDA review 
system was provided through consultation with Loren Carlson of Manufacturers Hanover, another successful investment banking firm and 
a fum knowledgeable about South Carolina. 
JEDA made no assumptions that its initial system of reviewing and analyzing applicants was the best it could be. Improvements were 
constantly being made to the evaluation process, to the information presented to the WRCC and to the information requested of the 
applicants. This is a natural evolutionary process with any new program. However, JEDA's analysis of historical fmancials and 
projections was always thorough. In performing its independent evaluation and analysis of the revenue projections provided with the 
applications, JEDA compared them against the historical performance of existing systems, considered current and proposed rate increases, 
growth projections based on expansion ofthe user base, and other assumptions presented by the system managers, the consulting engineers, 
or both. Projections that did not pass muster with these evaluations were discussed thoroughly with the system managers or consulting 
engineers and typically returned to the drawing board. Because JEDA ftles are not documented with staff-prepared projections based on 
historical data for comparison with the actual projections, does not mean that quality evaluations and comparisons with historical data were 
not performed. JEDA began administering the program with very limited funding and did not have the luxury of computer programs for 
preparing such projections. JEDA's number-crunching was done with calculators, pencils and paper, and the work papers were rarely 
retained once the bonds were issued. 
In addition to fmancial statements and projections, JEDA also carefully considered the system's rate history and the authority to raise rates, 
which was information provided in each application. JEDA also considered the economic environment in which the system operated, as 
evidenced by its comments to the WRCC, the information provided to the WRCC regarding area industries, the tax base and employment. 
JEDA further analyzed system operations and fmance, as evidenced by information provided to WRCC regarding capacity of the system, 
the largest users, bad debt history, and previous financings. Although refinements were made to the system, the basic analysis was 
thorough from the start. 
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As to the allegations that JEDA 's loan files lacked essential documentation for eleven of the thirty-four projects, we must disagree. The 
chart on page 8 of the LAC report highlights a number of areas of missing documentation which we will address. Turbeville 1990 was 
cited for a missing Schedule D - Financial to the application. While this particular two-page form was missing from the application, the 
key information requested on the form was provided in other schedules and attachments accompanying the application. TurbeVille 1990 
was also initially cited for not having current interim financial statements and no operating budget for the current fiscal year. Interim 
statements were unnecessary since the application was received in October 1989 with a copy of the June 30, 1989 audited year-end 
fmancial statements which were less than four months old. Furthermore, an operating budget for the current fiscal year was in fl.le and 
was provided to the LAC as Exhibit R. Georgetown 1990 was cited for not having current interim financial statements or de-tailed 
projections prepared or approved by the consulting engineer. Interim fmancials were unnecessary since the application was submitted 
September 12, 1989, with a June 30, 1989, audit report, less than three months old. As to the consulting engineer's approval of 
projections, this was inappropriate since Georgetown sought funding for a number of small projects handled by different engineers. 
Furthermore, management of Georgetown County Water and Sewer Authority was well qualified to prepare their own fmancial projections. 
The Finance Manager, LaDain Port, had a B.S. degree from the University of South Carolina, had completed several advanced accounting 
programs, and had managed the Authority's Finance Department since 1981. He operated under the direct supervision of the Executive 
Director, Robert E. Barker, who received his B.S. degree from Clemson University in 1970, his M.S. degree from Pennsylvania State 
University in 1971, had completed several advanced training programs, and had 13 years experience in water and wastewater management, 
having managed the Georgetown County Water and Sewer Authority since 1982. Mr. Barker also had direct supervisory responsibilities 
over the Engineering Manager, who was a professional engineer, and over the Superintendent of Operations. 
Edgefield 1990 was cited for missing interims, a missing budget, and missing projections. Interims were unnecessary since the application 
was submitted in October 1989 with a June 30, 1989, audit report, less than four months old. True, there was no budget and no 
projections, however historical debt service coverage was very strong, and there was an urgent need for a funding commitment because 
the system was operating under a moratorium imposed by DHEC. (Refer back to Exhibit F) Subsequently, Edgef'Ield County Water 
& Sewer Authority provided projeetions prior to reeeiving funding from the SCRA. They were included in the Official Statement 
and were prepared and signed by the administrator since the funding was for more than one project with more than one engineer. (See 
ExhibitS) Dillon 1991 was cited for missing projections prepared/approved by the consulting engineer. The flle contains summary 
projections signed by the consulting engineer, but not detailed projections. Dillon's engineer had initially submitted more detailed 
projections of revenues and expenses, and the debt service coverage worksheet for these pro formas remains in the flle. Prior to 
submission of the analysis to the WRCC, however, the engineer discovered that some of his assumptions were incorrect, and the 
projections were replaced by the summary projections found in the ftle. The first projections were destroyed when the permanent files 
were set up, since they had been superseded and no longer applied. Although the projections found in the file are not in detail, they 
are supported by the engineer's assumptions and signed by the engineer. (See Exhibit T) 
Staffing: JEDA 's staffmg of the SCRA program by one employee was by negotiated agreement between the Governor's Office staff (Dr. 
Harry Miley) and Representative Robert McLellan, then Chairman of the House Ways & Means committee. This agreement provided 
JEDA with emergency funding and was critical to program implementation, since the legislation did not provide funding for JEDA's 
administration of the program. Rather, actual expenses incurred were to be reimbursed not to exceed $100,000 per calendar year. Funds 
for reimbursement, however, were solely dependent upon bond proceeds being available. In management's judgement, the program 
employee possessed the necessary academic preparation (MBA), together with relevant banking experience essential to successful 
administration of this program. All work performed was monitored and reviewed carefully by management. 
Conformity with Lending Policy: Infrastructure financing is uniquely different from other JEDA lending. As pointed out by Tom Fink 
of the Public Finance Department of Chemical Securities, Inc. " ... there is a fundamental difference between the credit review criteria used 
for a private, commercial loan and that used for a debt secured by a municipality." (See Exhibit Q) For this reason, JEDA's general 
lending policies are largely inapplicable. These lending policies are directed at JEDA's commercial lending business, and the various 
levels of review and supervision utilize the commercial loan experience of JEDA 's loan staff and loan administration staff. As further 
stated by Mr. Fink, • ... it would be highly unlikely for a commercial credit officer to have the expertise necessary to evaluate a municipal 
credit, and vice versa." Aside from the program administrator, JEDA 's Executive Director is the only member of the staff or management 
team acutely familiar with municipal bond fmancing for water and sewer projects; The program administrator was closely supervised 
by the Executive Director, and his analysis and evaluation of each application was carefully reviewed and discussed with the Executive 
Director prior to their review and discussion with the Chairman of the Water Resources Coordinating Council and subsequent presentation 
to the WRCC for consideration. Furthermore, JEDA's Loan Committee is a committee of the JEDA Board of Directors, functioning on 
behalf of the JEDA Board to review and approve commercial loans and small issue lOB's (Industrial Development Bonds) within certain 
parameters. Neither the JEDA Board nor its Loan Committee had any direct responsibilities for review or approval of infrastructure 
applications. The JEDA Board's responsibility was to assign qualified staff to administer the program and report directly to the WRCC 
on matters relating to the infrastructure bond program. 
LAC/SCRA-93-2 South Carolina Resoums Authorily 
STATUS OF DEBT OBLIGATIONS (See pp. 10-13) 
This section addresses the performance of the infrastructure bond pool participants and their compliance with the provisions of the local 
bond ordinances after the bonds were issued. Although JEDA had no responsibility or authority concerning the participants at this point, 
it appears that some comments are warranted. There is every indication that most of the participants in the SCRA's three bond issues 
received no oversight, guidance or monitoring from anyone at the state level from the time the bonds were issued through year end 1993. 
It is not unusual that LAC's desk review for flllcal years 1992 and 1993 found eight borrowers not in compliance with the provisions of 
the local bond ordinances concerning debt service coverage. We must be reminded here that the legislation which created the 
infrastructure bond rmancing program specif'ICally targeted small rural communities that typically had difraculty obtaining rmancing 
for water and sewer projects. It stands to reason that if they needed assistance in qualifying and obtaining the fmancing, then they would 
also need some degree of assistance and monitoring to comply with the ongoing requirements. 
We also wish to comment on the following statement by the LAC regarding reserve accounts: "By not including any provision for reserves, 
our calculation of debt service coverage would be overstated and, therefore, probably overly optimistic." Note that the 120% coverage 
requirement is intended to cover 100% of debt service with a 20% buffer to cover reserve funding and contingencies. This is a standard 
in the industry. Allowances for reserves should never be treated as operating expenses when calculating debt service coverage. 
Furthermore, any system whose debt service coverage goes much beyond 120% can be assumed to be overcharging its users. 
STATE fUNDS USED TO PAY LOCAL DEBT-New Ellenton (See pp. 15-23) 
Revenues and User Projections Overstated: In commenting about the overstatement of projections of revenues and users, the LAC Audit 
Staff criticized JEDA on page 17 of its Report to the General Assembly for not requiring that the Highway 19 corridor, beyond the town 
limits of New Ellenton, be eliminated from the project. It should be noted, however, that, in the judgement of the Aiken County Council, 
this rapidly growing Highway 19 corridor was a priority growth area of Aiken County and the availability of sewer service to this corridor 
would be" ... an enhancementto economic growth in the county. • This was attested in Resolution No. 89-12-455 passed by Aiken County 
Council on December 19, 1989. It should be noted, also, that the service area for the town's water system extends well beyond the town 
limits and it was anticipated that the town's sewer service area would do likewise. However, several months after the bonds were issued 
in June 1990, but before the New Ellenton project had begun, Aiken County held a referendum for county-wide sewer service and the 
referendum was defeated. This referendum would have authorized mandatory taps for anyone in the county with access to a sewer line. 
This defeat of the referendum, in itself, would not have been cause to halt the Highway 19 corridor phase of the project, but would have 
presented a golden opportunity for an effective marketing campaign to sell the benefits of sewer service to the businesses and homeowners 
already located in this corridor. It is also surprising that this referendum defeat did not elicit some attention and support from those who 
were responsible for monitoring the SCRA projects at the state level. One should not lose sight of the fact that this project was prioritized 
by the WRCC under the criteria of Regional Development and Development Potential, and at that time these criteria were still valid for 
this project (see p.46). 
JEDA's Application Review: It is true that there is " ... no evidence that the information presented to the WRCC mentioned that the 
treatment site was to be on private land. • However, JEDA was informed in late December 1989 by Aiken County officials that it was 
their intent to acquire a treatment plant which was already permitted and under construction by a private developer to serve the New 
Ellenton/South Aiken area. Furthermore, the resolution passed by the New Ellenton City Council indicated the decision of the City 
Council to improve its Commission of Public Works by " ... acquiring ... an interim wastewater treatment plant located on lands owned by 
Cedar Creek Properties, Inc. • This was understood to mean that the plant and land were being acquired by the City. During the 
application review and prior to the issuance of bonds by the SCRA for this project, JEDA had no knowledge of a contract between Cedar 
Creek Utility and the City dated April 16, 1990. 
As charged by the LAC, there is also no evidence that JEDA made the WRCC " ... aware of the relationship of the project engineer with 
Cedar Creek/Banks Mill." This is because JEDA knew only that the engineer for Cedar Creek, had obtained the NPDES permit for a 
private wastewater treatment plant, which would now be acquired by the City of New Ellenton, and that he would eontinue the project 
as engineer for the City of New Ellenton. Based on the information presented to JEDA in the March 8, 1990 letter referenced by the 
LAC, there was no indication of any impropriety or conflict of interest at that time. Not until September/October 1992 did JEDA learn 
that the project engineer was more than the engineer for Cedar Creek, and that he was a partner in Banks Mill Partnership which owned 
Cedar Creek Properties, Inc. In September 1992, upon receipt of verbal information regarding alleged improper activities connected with 
the New Ellenton project, JEDA's Executive Director met with the Executive Director of the Lower Savannah Council of Governments 
who volunteered to provide JEDA with the information he had obtained. Following this meeting, the Executive Director of the Budget 
and Control Board, Dr. Luther F. Carter, was notified and he met with these two gentlemen to discuss the allegations. Following this 
meeting, JED A's program administrator spent five workdays in the New Ellenton/Aiken County area in late September and early October 
of 1992, meeting with various officials and reviewing all identified project records to ascertain any discernible violations 
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or misappropriation of funds. Upon completion of this fact finding mission and evaluation of the information found, a report was prepared 
and submitted to Dr. Luther F. Carter, Executive Director of the Budget and Control Board. Although the Cedar Creek/Banks Mill 
relationship with the project engineer was turned up, there was still no obvious evidence of any wrongdoing. (See Exhibit M) 
As to the LAC Audit Staffs statement that it • ... found no evidence that JEDA or WRCC ever questioned the number of sewer system 
users projected in the preliminary engineering report, although, as pr.eviously discussed, these figures were grossly overstated ... •, we 
cannot deny that there was no written evidence in the JEDA flies regarding this. However, we can assert that the preliminary engineering 
report, including the number and location ofthe projected system users, was the subject of a lengthy meeting with the consulting engineer, 
the Mayor and JEDA's program administrator during the application and evaluation period. The user projections were presented as 
reasonable and even conservative projections, considering the significant growth forecast for the area in connection with the plans 
Westinghouse had voiced for the Savannah River Site and ancillary development of research and development facilities. At the time, no 
one at the City, County or State level seemed to question that this growth would happen, but we all now know what actually happened. 
This should remind everyone involved with this project how much clearer the vision is when one is using "hindsight" rather than 
"foresight." This project was viewed as an ideal response to the General Assembly's charge to the WRCC to use infrastructure as a 
proactive tool by providing infrastructure funding for areas with development potential. The WRCC could also see this project spurring 
development and having a very positive economic impact on a town that had heretofore experienced very little economic development, 
not to mention eliminating health hazards already mentioned. 
Use of Sewer Bond Funds for Other Purchases; Former Mayor Indicted for Fraud, Embezzlement: As to the recent discoveries of misuse 
of sewer bond funds and the indictment of the former Mayor for fraud and embezzlement, JEDA firmly believes that no amount of due 
diligence, investigation or evaluation can prevent or deter a public official from perpetrating a crime. Even the most experienced lenders 
sometimes fall prey to fraud and embezzlement. (See Exhibit N) 
No Controls Over Disbursement of Funds: With municipal bond financing, oversight and accountability for the bond construction funds 
are typically the responsibility of local officials and the consulting engineer, in compliance with the bond trustee's disbursement 
requirements. This is ordinarily sufficient, unless the criminal factor enters the picture. 
The Referendum Issue: JEDA relied on the local bond counsel's legal opinion that a referendum was unnecessary for the New Ellenton 
sewer project. When the fmal bond ordinance was passed, indicating that there was an existing sewer system, JEDA was totally unaware 
of this action. This stage of the program was under the control of the State Treasurer and the bond counsel appointed by the SCRA. This 
should have raised a "red flag" that something was awry, and instituted at least further discussion between the SCRA's bond counsel and 
local bond counsel. 
As to the objections raised to the Governor's office by a group of citizens prior to the issuance of the bond, JEDA investigated the 
allegations. Based on letters from Mayor Shaw, John Harte, the Town Attorney, and Frieda Walker of the Aiken County Public Service 
Authority, it was determined that the objections did not speak for a significant number of the residents of New Ellenton, nor did they 
accurately address any of the issues involved in the bond fmancing. (See Exhibit 0) 
STATE FUNDS USED TO PAY LOCAL DEBT-Ridgeland and Turbeville 
(See pp. 23-24) 
The facts of these two projects are very clear. The General Assembly authorized construction of new prisons in Ridgeland and Turbeville. 
The water and sewer projects were a prerequisite of construction and revenues to be generated from the Department of Corrections would 
well support debt service on the bonded debt. The WRCC approved funding based on this information and the SCRA funded the projects. 
Then funding for the prisons was delayed and the General Assembly recognized its responsibility for debt service on the SCRA bonds, 
which had been issued in reliance on commitments authorized by the General Assembly. 
Chapter 3: The Role of WRCC 
PROJECT CRITERIA (See page 25) 
The eight criteria outlined in the SCRA Act and reiterated on page 25 of the LAC Draft Report were discussed at length in JEDA's 
comments responding to the LAC's evaluation of its performance in relation to these criteria. 
FUNDING GUIDELINES (See pp. 26-27) 
The LAC Audit Staff reports that the WRCC did not fund projects on the basis of the eight criteria referenced above. This is absolutely 
false, as evidenced by JEDA's comments under Chapter 2 and the Exhibits referenced in those comments. JEDA believes that the record 
demonstrates that JEDA and the WRCC acted responsibly in meeting the legislative intent of the program to promote the general health 
and welfare of all South Carolinians and to act as an incentive to foster economic growth, particularly in the rural, less-developed areas 
LAC/SCRA-93-2 South Carolina Resou~ Authority 
of the state. LAC states that the WRCC simply approved all applicants brought before them for consideration. What the LAC overlooks 
are the multitude of communities in the rural, less-developed areas of the state (See Exhibit U) that JEDA tried to bring to the WRCC, 
but which could not be persuaded to request funding from the SCRA for their water and sewer needs. Those communities who did apply 
through JEDA and the WRCC for SCRA funding represented valid needs which qualified for funding under one or more of the criteria 
established by the General Assembly in the SCRA Act. 
The LAC makes reference to the Operating Guidelines for Receipt, Rating and Ranking which were presented by JEDA to the WRCC 
at one of its early meetings. Their attempt to fmd merit in these Guidelines is totally unfounded. The Guidelines were simply dropped 
because it was determined, in individual discussions with members of the WRCC, that they were far too bureaucratic and would seriously 
hamper the flexibility necessary to operate efficiently and achieve the intent of the program. The existing Federal and State sources of 
infrastructure funding were good examples of programs bogged down in bureaucratic red tape. This new program needed to be different 
and needed to emphasize flexibility and efficiency. JEDA believes that the statistics regarding the criteria met by the projects funded by 
SCRA speak well for the performance of JEDA and the WRCC. Not all of the funding was focused in one area, or on one or two criteria, 
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TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (See pp. 28-29) 
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In response to the LAC's comments regarding the usefulness of the Geographic Information System (GIS) in evaluating applicants, JEDA 
wishes to note that the system was used as soon as the data was loaded and reliable, but that was not achieved until after the last bond 
issue of the SCRA in 1991. From the time the GIS was first introduced by Sena Black of the State Development Board (now the 
Department of Commerce) to the WRCC at its 11120/89 meeting, JEDA monitored the progress of Ms. Black's division in loading the 
databases. As soon as the databases were relatively complete and reliable, JEDA obtained reports and maps and used them religiously 
in marketing the infrastructure funding program. They were quite helpful to use in discussing new projects with system managers, but 
the WRCC never had the opportunity to use them in evaluating applications. 
APPLICANT SUMMARY (See page 30) 
The LAC criticizes JEDA for using the 1989 Applicant Summary to present information to the WRCC for five participants in the 1990 
bond issue. JEDA acknowledges that the Applicant Summary developed later was more comprehensive and more useful to the WRCC 
in evaluating applicants. However, JEDA must again emphasize that this was a new program which initially had some imperfections and 
was constantly being improved upon. As stated before, this is a natural evolutionary process with any new program. JEDA would not 
have been discharging its duty to the WRCC and to the General Assembly if it simply put all funding requests on hold while it tried to 
develop the ideal Applicant Summary. 
LAC/SCRA-93-2 South CaroUna Resources Authority 
~IIIIIOOUililil]i~illllll 
0 Ol Ol 0185803 2 ~RKETING EFFORTS (See page 31) 
JEDA challenges the LAC's allegation that JEDA did not direct its marketing efforts for the 1990 and 1991 issues at infrastructure projects 
the program was intended to serve. JEDA wisht'S to emphasize at this juncture that the WRCC did not interpret the SCRA Act in 
exactly the same fashion as the LAC seems to at this time. The WRCC did not believe that the program was limited to rural, lt'Ss-
developed areas, although it gave priority consideration to applicants from such areas. As already noted earlier, the extra efforts 
made by the WRCC to provide funding assistance to the towns of Williston and Santee speak directly to this. As to the LAC's comments 
about JEDA's inadequate records of responses to JEDA 's 1989 needs survey, JEDA maintained the individual responses, summarized them 
and reported them to the WRCC. These records were made available to the LAC audit staff. Also, contrary to the statement by the LAC 
that " ... we could not confirm any relationship between the responses ... and the applicants or what, if any, follow-up was performed," 
JED A's records documented that out of24 communities which responded with identifiable needs, 11 were actually funded, although JEDA 
individually called on each one. Note also that of the 24 respondents, at least 20 could be considered small and rural. JEDA proceeded 
from this point to meet with each of the ten COG directors across the state to develop additional leads on community infrastructure needs 
with their regions. As earlier noted, JEDA actively focused its marketing efforts on the rural areas of the state, but not to the detriment 
of the other areas in the state. 
COORDINATION OF fUNDING (See pp. 32-33) 
The LAC Audit Staff is correct in stating that " ... the WRCC established no formal procedures for coordination of funding. • The WRCC 
chose not to expend its energies in developing formal procedures before it had an opportunity to see how this new program could be 
coordinated with other infrastructure funding sources. However, this does not mean that the WRCC failed to coordinate funding with 
other sources. JEDA and the WRCC made every attempt possible to coordinate funding with other available sources, which included the 
Economic Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce (EDA), Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), the 
Division of Economic Development of the Governor's Office (DED) which administers Community Development Block Grants(CDBG), 
and the Division of Local Governments (DLG) of the Budget and Control Board which administers a small fund of state grants, and the 
State Revolving Fund (SRF). While JEDA was able to coordinate several funding packages with EDA, i.e., Dillon, Estill and Turbeville, 
BOA's funding was very specialized and targeted a limited market. These three projects also received funding from DED grants, while 
Dillon and Turbeville also received DLG grants. As already noted, Saluda CPW was funded by SCRA in coordination with an EPA grant, 
a DLG grant, and a CDBG grant. The Town of Ridgeland was funded jointly by the SCRA and the SRF. Due to the fact that FmHA 
is a lender of last resort, it is impossible to coordinate funding with it. Furthermore, JEDA found it difficult to coordinate funding with 
the SRF, which often seemed to take a competitive posture with the bond program, but it made every effort to do so. (Refer back to 
Exhibit D) Any serious effort of the WRCC to coordinate funding sources ended with the untimely death of Currie Spivey in 1991. 
NOTE: Please note that the Legislative Audit Council would not allow the space necessary for publication of the Exhibits referenced by 
JEDA in its response, however, JEDA chose to leave the references to Exhibits intact and will make these referenced exhibits available 
to interested parties. 
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